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THE REGULATION OF MULTIPLE EMPLOYER
TRUSTS: PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE
EDWARD A. SCALLET*
INTRODUCTION
On Labor Day 1974 President Ford signed into law the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).1 The title of the
law, the statement issued by President Ford, and ERISA's "Findings
and Declaration of Policy ' 2 highlight what is generally considered the
major intent of the law: to protect the retirement income of partici-
pants in and beneficiaries of this country's pension plans. For the first
time, Congress recognized the impact of the private pension system on
the economy of the country and the lives of millions of employees.
During the ensuing eight years, courts have been faced with the prac-
tical task of applying the words of the statute to the particular problems
of pension plans. For the most part, this initial interpretation period
has presented few major problems for the courts as ERISA's detailed
provisions and comprehensive legislative history have provided consid-
erable guidance In short, it would be fair to say that there has been
* Thompson & Mitchell, Washington, D.C. A.B., 1972, Harvard College; J.D., 1975, Wash-
ington University. Member of the Missouri and Washington, D.C. Bar Associations.
I. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 to 1461 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
2. ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
3. ERISA is divided into four Titles and numerous Parts. Title I is commonly referred to as
the "Labor Provisions"; Title II contains amendments to the Internal Revenue Code; Title III
deals with coordination between the Department of Labor and the Department of the Treasury;
and Title IV establishes the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, a quasi-governmental insur-
ance system intended to guarantee a designated level of benefits to participants in certain types of
pension plans.
Title I is further divided into five Parts. Part One contains reporting and disclosure require-
ments; Part Two mandates minimum structural standards for pension plans in the areas of partici-
pation, vesting and benefit accrual; Part Three deals with funding of pension plans; Part Four lays
out rules of conduct for fiduciaries of plans; and Part Five deals with administration and enforce-
ment. Title II, the tax amendments, largely repeats the minimum standards set out in Parts Two
and Three of Title I.
ERISA as a whole represents the culmination of ten years of congressional hearings, studies and
reports. It builds on a history of congressional and judicial experience with long-standing provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code which granted favorable tax treatment to "qualified" pension
plans. To a lesser extent, ERISA is also founded on the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958), and certain provisions of the Labor Management
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little dispute about either ERISA coverage of pension plans or the prin-
ciples which Congress intended to apply.
The same cannot be said for the judicial experience with the other
type of employee fringe benefit arrangement covered by ERISA--em-
ployee welfare plans.4 It can be persuasively argued that the recog-
nized abuses in ERISA pension plans are no more severe than those
appearing in welfare plans,' and that welfare abuses have a significant
adverse effect on millions of employees.6 Nevertheless, application of
ERISA in this area has been hampered by several difficult issues, most
of which are traceable to a lack of congressional precision in designing
enforcement mechanisms specific to welfare plans, and more impor-
tantly, to inadequate coordination of state and federal responsibility in
this area.
This article examines this problem by discussing the congressional,
judicial and regulatory experience with one type of entity operating in
the field of employee welfare benefit plans-the "multiple employer
trust" (MET). Broadly defined, a MET is an arrangement through
which groups of employers with small numbers of employees are
brought together so that they may obtain medical coverage for the
composite group as a whole at more favorable rates.
Despite this worthy goal, state insurance regulators fear abuse of the
system. One enforcement official has stated that METs have "the po-
tential to become the most sophisticated and profitable white-collar
crime in America,"7 and most regulators would agree that the genesis
Relations Act, particularly § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The record
of hearings, prior legislation, studies and congressional reports relating to ERISA alone covers
many thousands of pages.
4. Only Title I of ERISA contains requirements applicable to welfare plans, and of this
Title's five Parts, only portions of Part 1, 4, and 5 apply to welfare plans. See generally Taggart
Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., Inc., 617 F.2d 1208, 1210-11 (5th Cir. 1980); Wadsworth
v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 74 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978).
5. For example, Representative Claude Pepper, Chairman of the House Select Committee
on Aging, stated that welfare plans "are being looted on a scale that few have dared to dream
possible." See Penn, Organized Crime Finds Rich Pickings in Rise of Union Health Plans, Wall St.
J., Oct. 5, 1982, at 1, col. 6 (eastern ed.).
6. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 426, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979): "Few things are more important
to the well-being and financial security of the millions of labor union members and their families
throughout the Nation than the proper administration of their employee welfare as well as pen-
sion plans." Id
7. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1983) (testimony of Tyrone Fahner, Attorney Gen-
eral of Illinois) [hereinafter cited as March Hearings].
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of the problem is ERISA itself. As the same official has noted, the
operators of METs have used ERISA "to play federal and state author-
ities off against each other while they [have] systematically drained the
assets of the trust."' This central problem of a seeming inability to en-
force existing laws against a recognized abuse has sent Congress, the
Department of Labor, state officials, the courts and various commenta-
tors into a confusing and often contradictory whirl of activity.
This article attempts to introduce a coherent, balanced, and, above
all, comprehensive perspective on this issue. Part One examines both
the economic importance of the MET as it relates to the private health
care system in this country, and the general dimensions of the regula-
tors' enforcement difficulties.
Part Two traces the legal enforcement controversy on both the state
and federal levels. One issue which has received little or no notice by
commentators and state regulators-the difficulties of the Department
of Labor (DOL) in asserting jurisdiction in this area-is examined at
length.
Part Three speculates about the future roles of the DOL and state
insurance regulators concerning the exercise of jurisdiction over METs.
This includes a discussion of the fundamental differences in approach
of state and federal law. It concludes with a theoretical framework for
coordinating these two legal systems, and offers some practical sugges-
tions for improving coordination between state and federal regulators.
As noted, however, the MET issue is perhaps more important be-
cause of its influence on the broader issue of employee welfare plans
generally. Questions about the scope of ERISA's preemption of state
law, the interpretation of ERISA's fiduciary provisions, and other un-
certainties surrounding ERISA may have found their first expression in
the MET context, but may now reach beyond that area and influence
the future regulation of more traditional types of welfare plans.
I. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE MET PROBLEM
A. The Rise of Group Health Insurance
The dramatic increase in the number of persons covered by private
pension plans was well documented by Congress in its consideration of
ERISA.9 Less documented, but equally dramatic, was the increase in
8. Id at 11.
9. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1973).
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health insurance coverage. In 1948, only 24% of the population had
health insurance; by 1977, that figure stood at 78%.10 Much of that
increase can be attributed to the expansion of group health plans pri-
marily offered in connection with employment. In 1950, only 49% of
employees received health care coverage through their employer. In
1974, nearly 70% were covered.11 The numbers underlying these per-
centages tell the story even more dramatically. By 1980, it was esti-
mated that more than sixty-one million workers in the private nonfarm
sector worked for establishments offering health benefits, while only
seven million worked for establishments not offering such benefits.' 2
The impact on the economy is substantial. From existing data, it has
been estimated that well in excess of ten billion dollars is spent for
coverage of employees through group health insurance in the private
nonfarm sector. 13
The specific mechanisms for underwriting these benefits vary. Most
establishments (approximately 92%) underwrite benefits through insur-
ance contracts. Of this percentage, 29% contract with Blue Cross/Blue
Shield, 57% contract with commercial insurance carriers, 3% use a com-
bination of both, and 4% contract with health maintenance organiza-
tions.14 Only 8% of establishments in the nonfarm sector "self-insure"
benefits without contracting with a third party to guarantee benefits;
that is, those employers promise to provide specific benefits without
contracting with a third party to guarantee payment of claims or provi-
sion of health services.1 5
B. The Role of the MET in Group Health Insurance
A basic function of insurance is apportioning risk. 16 The role of the
insurer is essentially to "assume the risk of an event whose happening
is uncertain or unknown at the time of the making of the promise.'1 7
10. Carroll & Arnett, Private Health Insurance Plans in 1977 Coverage, Enrollment, and Fi-
nancial Experience, in I HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 2-3 (1979).
11. Skolnik, Twenty-Five Years of Employee-Benoft Plans, in SOCIAL SECURITY BULL. 3, 4
(1976).
12. MALHORTA, MCCAFFREE, WILLS & BAKER, 2 EMPLOYMENT RELATED HEALTH BENE-
FITS IN PRIVATE NONFARM BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (1980) [herein-
after cited as BATrELLE STUDY].
13. Id
14. Id at 78.
15. Id
16. R. MFHR & E. CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 19 (6th ed. 1976).
17. Helner, The Scope of Insurance Regulation" What is Insurance for Purposes of Regula.
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To fulfill this function, the insurance contract must be part of a general
arrangement "to distribute actual losses among a large group of per-
sons bearing somewhat similar risks.""8 The critical variable for the
insurer is to determine when risk has been apportioned to "a sufficient
number of exposure units to make . .. individual losses collectively
predictable." 9
Because of this essential nature of insurance, the cost to the insured
bears a direct relationship to the size of the group covered by the con-
tract. Assuming such variables as age, occupation and socio-economic
status stay the same, the general rule is that the larger the group of
insureds, the smaller the premium. This has the effect of compelling
smaller employers to pay a higher per-insured premium.
Even before the passage of ERISA, many insurance companies rec-
ognized that there was a need for a mechanism enabling smaller em-
ployers to reduce the cost of insurance coverage. Accordingly, these
companies formed trusts to collect premium payments from a large
number of small employers. The trusts would then purchase a contract
covering this combined pool of insureds. Since the risk could be dis-
tributed across the pool, the cost to each trust participant was consider-
ably lower than the cost would have been for each employer
individually.
Insurance companies were not alone in recognizing the advantages
of this approach. Many independent agents in the insurance industry
also formed their own "multiple employer trusts," and purchased. cov-
erage from a licensed insurance company for the trust as a whole at
rates based on the large pool of insureds.
C The Uninsured MET
If METs had been structured so that benefits ultimately would be
underwritten by a licensed insurance carrier, it is doubtful that much
attention would have been paid to these entities. Since the states
clearly had authority to regulate the insurance company underwriting
benefits, there was some assurance that promised benefits would be
tion, 12 AM. J. COMP. L. 494,496 (1963). See generaly R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE
LAW § 1-2(b)(4), at 6 (1971).
18. W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 2 (3d ed. 1951).
19. R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, supra note 16, at 32. See generally Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312
U.S. 531, 539 (1941).
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paid.20 This, however, was not to be the case. Beginning in 1975, a
new phenomenon began to appear-the uninsured or self-insured
MET. Instead of contracting with an insurance company to pay bene-
fits, these METs promised benefits directly from the trust fund itself.
As is the case with many of the controversies surrounding METs,
considerable disagreement abounds as to the reason for the prolifera-
tion of uninsured METs. Representatives of these METs claim that the
impetus for their creation came from the fact that in 1975-76 many
insurance companies decided not to underwrite small employers.21
The insurance industry generally denies this accusation, claiming that
there is vigorous competition among companies for this business.22
Whatever the reason, there is little dispute that many insured METs
become uninsured because the carrier cancels coverage, and it is diffi-
cult to find a new carrier to take the business without increasing rates.23
On the plus side, supporters of the MET industry boast substantial
cost savings for small employers, particularly in the area of reduced
administrative costs. 24 On the minus side, however, even they admit
their industry is rife with unsavory persons who regularly charge exor-
bitant commissions and administrative fees.25 There is also substantial
agreement within and without the MET industry as to why these un-
scrupulous MET operators have appeared. Ironically, the primary rea-
son for the appearance of these unscrupulous MET operators was the
passage of the first federal legislation specifically intended to control
this type of abuse.
In 1978, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) complained to Congress about the sudden and alarming ap-
20. See Brummond, The Legal Status of Uninsured, Noncollectively Bargained MultiNle.En-
ployer Welfare Trusts Under ERISA and State Insurance Laws, 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 701, 702
(1977).
21. See Letter from George T. de Heuck & Associates, June 7, 1977, reprinted in II NAIC
PROCEEDINGS 395 (1977) [hereinafter cited as de -euck Letter]. The author claims that 88% of the
commercial insurers abandoned small employer coverage between June 1975 and September
1976. Id at 396.
22. See II NAIC PROCEEDINGS 400-01 (1977).
23. The METs claim that the necessity for establishing reserves and overall inexperience with
the insured group causes insurers to overestimate initial premiums. See id at 396. The insurance
industry attributes the reluctance of companies to take on MET business to a distrust of the ad-
ministrative and compensation structure set up by the MET operators. See id at 400-01.
24. For example, Mr. de Heuck claims that METs, on the average, use 70% of the contributed
money for the payment of claims-a figure considerably larger than that applicable to insurance
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pearance of uninsured METs. As the NAIC painstakingly docu-
mented, far too many uninsured METs had become insolvent and left
millions of promised benefits unpaid.26 In 1978, the NAIC estimated
that there were three million persons covered by thirty uninsured
METs with an annual contribution base of $300 million.2 7 In the eight-
een months preceding the NAIC testimony, at least five of these METs
had become insolvent; the first two of them had unpaid claims exceed-
ing $7.5 million.2"
The NAIC returned to Congress four years later, the situation having
improved little. Frank Damon, Chief Deputy Insurance Commissioner
for the State of California, testified that the number of METs operating
in California alone had grown to 150.29 Between 1977 and 1982 forty-
five METs in California went out of business; eighteen of these left
unpaid claims.30 The Illinois Attorney General estimated that more
than $1.2 million in claims were left unpaid when several METs in that
state became insolvent.3 The Indiana Insurance Department's Deputy
Commissioner for Legal and Financial Services expressed similar con-
cern about the economic and social costs of uninsured METs.32
In discussing the various states' enforcement programs, several
themes with important implications for the future regulation of METs
emerged. The first was the differences among states in their laws cover-
ing METs. At one extreme was Indiana, whose representative reported
good success under the summary investigative proceedings and insur-
ance agent responsibility provisions of that state's insurance laws.3 At
the other extreme was California where, despite some criminal convic-
tions, at least one court had held that METs were not even within the
26. See Oversight on ERISA: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 656 (1978) (statement of the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners by Herbert W. Anderson, Commissioner of Insurance of the
State of Iowa and Chairman, NAIC ERISA Preemption Task Force) [hereinafter referred to as
NAIC Testimony'].
27. Id at 658.
28. Id at 659.
29. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm.
on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1983) (statement of Frank Damon) (obtained
from page proofs of hearing transcript) [hereinafter cited as October Hearings].
30. Id
31 March Hearings, supra note 7, at 6.
32. Id at 61 (statement of Emil J. Molim).
33. Id at 62.
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jurisdiction of the insurance laws.34 All regulators agreed, however,
that their enforcement had been hindered by uncertainty about ER-
ISA's possible preemption of state law.35
Another theme which emerged was the elusiveness of MET opera-
tors. Mr. Damon from California expressed particular concern with
the "rollover" phenomenon-on six occasions since 1977, operators
who had been forced to close down in one place, simply reorganized
somewhere else. 6 In one case, a MET operator "rolled over" his oper-
ation five times in five different states. 7 Closely related to the rollover
phenomenon was another major state enforcement problem-the diffi-
culty that the states had in acting before matters reached the crisis
stage. For example, Illinois representatives reported some success in
arranging for reputable insurers to continue coverage for employees
previously covered by insolvent METs,38 but decried the absence of an
effective pre-operational review of METs.3 9
Those testifying expressed near-unanimity about one thing-the
"cavalier. . . attitude" of the DOL. ° One charged that the DOL had
"all but abdicated [its] responsibility" for METs; several charged that
delay at the DOL in "certifying" METs was the root cause of the states'
inability to regulate METs effectively.41 This comment was the result
of the experience of several states when they had sought access to MET
records, only to be met with the argument that the DOL had not yet
ruled on the status of the entity under ERISA. Most regulators ex-
pressed an interest in working with the DOL, primarily in the area of
delegating investigative authority to the states from the DOL,42 but the
California representative expressed the thought that the DOL has not
made a "good faith attempt" to work with the states.43
34. See October Hearings, supra note 29, at 12. See infra notes 224-26 and accompanying text
for a thorough discussion of enforcement of state insurance laws against METs.
35. October Hearings, supra note 29, at 13.
36. Id at 12. For a thorough discussion of the implications of the "rollover" phenomenon on
the MET enforcement program, see infra notes 240-45 and accompanying text.
37. March Hearings, supra note 7, at 54.
38. Id at 6, 24. See infra notes 92-93 & 255-56 and accompanying text for a complete discus-
sion of the pre-operational review requirement for METs.
39. October Hearings, supra note 29 at 20, 33; March Hearings, supra note 7, at 9, 13-14.
40. Id at 22.
41. October Hearings, supra note 29, at 17, 36, 39.
42. Id at 39-40. See infra notes 253-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of DOL-state
coordination.
43. Id at 13.
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The 1982 hearings capsulize the MET problem as it currently exists.
Records reveal the story of widespread failure of arrangements
designed to provide health coverage to millions of employees. Enforce-
ment has been hampered in the first instance by uncertainty engen-
dered by ERISA's provision preempting state law, and the tendency of
some state courts to decline to act until the DOL rules on the status of
these entities under ERISA. Once that obstacle has been passed, states
have had varying success applying their particular laws to specific situ-
ations, and, on the whole, have been unable to prevent abuses before
they have occurred. Even when the states have been effective, MET
operators often have eluded authorities by moving to another state. Fi-
nally, there has been a breakdown in effective coordination between
the states and the DOL.
Only partial blame for the lack of progress in halting MET abuses
between 1977 and 1982 can be laid at the feet of the state insurance
commissioners and the DOL. It must be understood that the ultimate
responsibility for interpreting and enforcing the law lies in the courts.
Both the NAIC and the DOL have furnished the courts with the theo-
retical framework for enforcing the law against METs, but the per-
ceived ambiguities in the law and the failure of some courts to consider
the consequences of their holdings on the entire industry have resulted
in decisions encouraging METs to continue their operations. It is
therefore necessary to discuss the development of the law as applied to
METs.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JURISDICTION OVER METs
A. Jurisdiction Over METs Under State Law
1. The ERISA preemption provision
One of the goals of ERISA was to replace the pre-ERISA patchwork
of limited federal oversight and varying state regulation of employee
benefit plans with a scheme of exclusive federal control. This goal,
implemented in part in section 514(a) of ERISA provides:
[T]he provisions of [ERISA] shall supercede any and all state laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan [covered
by ERISA]. 44
The courts have generally held that this language evidences a congres-
44. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976).
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sional intent to preempt a wide variety of state laws which have an
impact on the operation and establishment of employee benefit plans.45
At the same time, however, Congress recognized that commercial en-
tities, and particularly insurance companies, played a large part in pro-
viding services to employee benefit plans.46 In the case of insurance
companies, Congress has traditionally left the regulation of insurance
in the hands of state insurance commissioners."7 Although ERISA
does regulate certain activities of insurance companies related to plans,
for example, when such companies undertake to serve as plan
fiduciaries,48 ERISA clearly was not intended to make fundamental
changes in the basic structure of federal-state relations in the field of
insurance regulation. Thus, ERISA section 514 also provides:
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall
be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which regulates insurance ....
As will be seen, judicial interpretation of this clause, particularly in
the area of what constitutes a law "regulating insurance," has impor-
tant implications for METs and insured welfare plans generally.50 In
the early years of the regulatory experience with METs, however, an-
other provision of the ERISA preemption provision assumed consider-
ably more significance. That provision is the addition to section 514 of
the following language (the "except as provided in subparagraph (B)"
language quoted above):
(B) Neither an employee benefit plan [covered by ERISA]... nor any
trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance
company or other insurer ... or to be engaged in the business of insur-
ance ... for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate
insurance companies .... 1
This has become known as the "deemer clause"-by its express terms,
it prevents a state from calling a true employee benefit plan an insur-
ance company so as to evade the preemptive intent of section 514.
45. See infra notes 185-94 and accompanying text.
46. See Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 78 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980
(1978).
47. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1976); infra notes 189-94 and accompa-
nying text.
48. See infra note 198.
49. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1976).
50. See infra notes 157-83 and accompanying text.
51. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1976).
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The NAIC has consistently taken the position that uninsured METs
constitute insurance companies under most state insurance laws.52 As
it explained to Congress in 1978, however, the language of section 514,
and particularly the "deemer" provision, has "created a climate of un-
certainty which has been used by certain entrepreneurs to avoid state
insurance laws."53 Specifically, MET operators claimed that their entity
was an "employee welfare benefit plan" under ERISA, and thus could
not be "deemed" to be an insurance company under state law.54
Despite this problem, the NAIC acknowledged in 1978 that "a few
test cases" established that most METs did not qualify as employee
welfare benefit plans, thus clearing the way for state insurance regula-
tion. 5 Indeed, the DOL filed an amicus curiae brief in one of the first
MET cases arguing that METs are generally not employee benefit
plans.56 In its report following the hearings, the House Committee ex-
pressed its agreement with the DOL/NAIC interpretation,5 7 and con-
cluded that it was "most reluctant" to pursue legislative clarification of
this issue. 8 Instead, it urged the NAIC ind DOL "to take appropriate
action to prevent the continued wrongful avoidance of proper state reg-
ulation by these entities."59
As discussed in the previous section of this article, the confidence of
the Ninety-Fourth Congress has become the uncertainty of the Ninety-
Eighth Congress which is still holding hearings on the problem of state
regulation of METs. What has happened in the interim is a case study
on the limitations of the judicial system when faced with a determined
group of persons intent on taking advantage of that system to perpetu-
ate a profitable--and illegal-business.
2. The "Primary Purpose" Analysis
It is often necessary to begin with the theoretical underpinnings of a
52. See I NAIC PROCEEDINGS 301 (1978).
53. See NAiC Testimony, supra note 26, at 656.
54. Id
55. Id at 661.
56. See Brief for Secretary of Labor, Bell v. Employee Sec. Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382
(D. Kan. 1977).
57. See ERISA Oversight Report of the Pension Task Force of the Subcomm. on Labor Stan-
dards of the House Comm on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Oversight Report].
58. Id at 11.
59. Id
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provision or, in the lexicon of statutory interpretation, congressional
intent. Unfortunately, there is no legislative history on point for ER-
ISA's "deemer" clause; therefore, it is necessary to look at the legal
climate as it existed in this area just prior to congressional enactment of
ERISA.
Both before and after ERISA, the primary funding vehicle for em-
ployers who established welfare plans for their employees was the
purchase of health coverage from an insurance company. A few large
employers, as well as some large employer-union jointly sponsored
plans, however, had not used insurance companies to underwrite bene-
fits. Instead, these plans paid benefits either out of general corporate
assets or assets of a trust fund established by the plan sponsor or spon-
sors. This decision to forego purchase of insurance from an insurance
company theoretically offered savings of as much as five percent.60
In an interesting foreshadowing of the MET controversy, the NAIC
initially complained of the "alarmingly accelerated trend" toward self-
insurance, and suggested that such plans be regulated under state insur-
ance laws.6' As two law review articles demonstrated several years
later, however, the majority of states declined to take this position.62 It
was thought significant that the "primary purpose" of these entities was
not to make a profit through widespread solicitation of the public at
large.63 Rather, the plans served a closed group of employees, and
therefore, the safeguards of state law were not needed because the em-
ployer and union sponsors had compelling employee-relations reasons
to operate the plans fairly and efficiently. 64
While ERISA was being considered, the highest courts in New York
60. See, e.g., CODY, GRouP PREMIUMS AND EXPERIENCE RATING, LIFE AND HEALTH IN-
suRANcE HANDBOOK 454, 468 (2d ed. 1964) (the insurer's decision to pass on the cost of state
premium taxes); Eilers, Minimum Premium Health Plan: InsuredNon.Insured, 36 J. INS. 63, 64-65
(1964) (the self-insured avoids the insurer's charges for commissions, risks and profits); Note, Self-
insured Employee Welfare Plans and the 501(c)(9) Trust: The Specter of State Regulation, 43 U.
CINN. L. REv. 325, 327 (1974) (the insurer's need to establish reserves). See generally Goetz,
Regulation of Uninsured Employee Welfare Plans Under State Insurance Laws, 1967 Wis. L. REV.
319, 320. But see Duesenberg, The Legality of Noninsured Employee Benefit Programs, 5 B.C.
INDUs. & COM. L. REv. 231, 232-35 (1964) (disputing alleged savings of self-insureds because of
increased administrative expenses on the fund level).
61. See I NAIC PROCEEDINGS 76 (1963).
62. See Duesenberg, supra note 60; Goetz, supra note 60.
63. See Duesenberg, supra note 60, at 239-40.
64. Id at 238; Goetz, supra note 60, at 345.
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and Missouri accepted cases presenting this issue.65 Given the general
intent of the ERISA preemption provision to save bona fide employee
benefit plans from state regulation, the inference is inescapable that the
underlying reason for the "deemer" provision was to resolve through
congressional action, the controversy in the states concerning self-in-
sured employee benefit plans.66
In the early years of the judicial experience with METs, the courts
adopted a "primary purpose" analysis in holding that METs were not
employee benefit plans. This analysis had two parts. The first was con-
ditioned on the reasoning that METs had, as a primary purpose, an
intent to evade state regulation.67 The second part of this "primary pur-
pose" analysis borrowed from the considerations used in the pre-ER-
ISA analysis of self-insured plans vis-A-vis insurance law, and held that
the primary purpose of the MET was to be a profitmaking venture
based on widespread public solicitation.68  Neither of these purposes
65. See State ex rel. Farmer v. Monsanto Co., 517 S.W.2d 129 (Mo. 1975); Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. New York State Tax Comm'n, 32 N.Y.2d 348, 298 N.E.2d 672, 345 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1973).
See also California-Western States Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 151 Cal. App. 2d
559, 312 P.2d 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
66. Not surprisingly, the METs offer an alternative interpretation of the "deemer" provision.
They claim that the provision was intended to open up new arrangements for providing health
benefits which could be operated outside the reach of state law. The only court which has re-
sponded to this argument has pointed out that there is no indication that Congress was even aware
that METs existed, and more generally, there is no legislative history setting out an intention to
encourage any particular form of employee benefit plan arrangement. See National Business
Conference Employee Benefit Ass'n v. Anderson, 451 F. Supp. 458, 461-62 (S.D. Iowa 1977). See
general, Comment, Regulation of Uninsured Multiole-Employer Trusts Under ERISA: An Open
Question Again, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REv. 913.
67. For example, in Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692 (7th
Cir. 1977), the MET was described as a "proprietory insurance venture designed to take advan-
tage of the void created by ERISA's preemption of state regulation." Id at 699. In Hamberlin v.
VIP Ins. Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977), the court stated:
Most importantly, by designating this an ERISA plan, they hoped to escape from direct
supervision and auditing by the State Insurance Department and from its coverage and
reserve requirements under the theory of federal preemption.
There has been substantial material concern over the increase in the numbers of unin-
sured multiple employer trusts such as this which have avoided state supervision and
have failed, leaving sick or injured employees holding an empty bag.
Id at 1198-99. And, in Bell v. Employee Sec. Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977), the
court stated: "Our conclusion is that just as a state cannot regulate an 'employee benefit plan' by
calling it 'insurance', neither can defendants merchandise an insurance program, free of state reg-
ulation, by terming it an 'employee benefit plan'." Id at 390.
68. See, e.g., Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., 617 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1980),
where the court, in holding that the MET involved was not an employee benefit plan, reasoned
that it was an enterprise "established and operated by independent businessmen for their personal
profit" consisting of "hundreds of unrelated subscriber customers." Id at 1210. Accord Wayne
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was consistent with the perceived purpose of "true" employee benefit
plans-those rooted in the employment relationship and not operated
for profit.
3. The Organizational Impetus Analysis
Had the courts continued to focus on this primary purpose analysis,
it is doubtful that the MET controversy would be as troublesome as it
has become in fact. Congress, however, also added a definition of "em-
ployee welfare benefit plan" in ERISA. Thus, the task of the regulators
was complicated by a need to work around this definition as well, and
that effort produced what can be called the "organizational impetus"
analysis.
Section 3(1) of ERISA provides that an "employee welfare benefit
plan" includes:
Any plan, fund or program which was heretofore or is hereafter estab-
lished or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by
both, to the extent such plan, fund or program was established or is main-
tained for the purpose of providing for its participants or beneficiaries,
through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, [health and welfare
benefits]... 69
It was the DOL which came up with a way to exclude METs from this
definition. According to the DOL, the answer to the MET problem lay
in the emphasized language above-the "established or maintained by
an employer" phrase in the ERISA section 3(1) definition. The DOL
reasoned that a multiple employer plan exists when a cognizable group
or association of employers establishes a benefit program for the em-
ployees of member employers, or when several employers and one or
more employee organizations jointly establish such a program, or when
several employers contribute to a plan established by an employee or-
ganization. In each of these contexts, there is some organizational rela-
tionship among the employers, or the employees, or both in coming
Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977), where the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated: "Congress would have had no reason to exempt from state
regulation insurance programs that are established and maintained by entrepreneurs for their own
profit." Id at 699.
The House Oversight Committee had emphasized the same considerations. In its Oversight
Report, supra note 57, it noted that "certain entrepreneurs have undertaken to market insurance
products to employers and employees at large" and that the "primary interest [of those persons] is
in profit[s]." The Committee added that such "purpose for [the] establishment or maintenance" of
the purported plans does not "meet the jurisdictional prerequisites of [ERISA]." Id at 10.
69. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
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together and establishing a single plan. But, in the case of METs, the
organizational impetus comes not from the subscribing employers, but
from the MET entrepreneurs. Accordingly, it cannot be said that
METs are "established or maintained" by employers within the mean-
ing of ERISA section 3(l).7o
As with the primary purpose analysis used by the courts in the early
years, the DOL organizational impetus test-specifically, that METs
were not "established or maintained by" employers within the meaning
of ERISA section 3(l)-found favor in the courts7' and Congress. 72
Unfortunately, no one had counted on the resourcefulness of the MET
entrepreneurs.
4. The METs Retrench and the Courts Waiver
The Congress, NAIC and DOL were not the only ones watching
these early cases; the MET promoters also were analyzing the decisions
for possible approaches to avoid state regulation. Although the results
of these cases had all been unfavorable to METs, there were some
loopholes left for exploitation.
Most of the cases involved METs concentrating their marketing ef-
forts on individuals. Their promoters argued and lost on the assertion
that these individuals had established the METs as "employee organi-
zations" within the meaning of the ERISA section 3(1) definition of
employee welfare benefit plan. The courts had no difficulty refuting
this argument,73 so MET operators reversed their field and began solic-
iting only employers. It was less expensive to solicit a handful of em-
ployers than to market the MET to thousands of individuals, and a
switch to employer solicitation by METs could produce more favorable
results in terms of legal analysis. If the courts could be induced to con-
centrate solely on the "established or maintained by employers" lan-
guage of ERISA section 3(1), then the METs might be able to
rearrange their structure to fit within this definition. This goal could
70. See DOL Advisory Op. 77-59A (August 26, 1977).
71. See Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., 617 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1980);
Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977).
72. See Oversight Report, supra note 57, at 10.
73. In Bell v. Employee Sec. Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382, 394 (D. Kan. 1977), the court
reasoned that individuals who happen to be employed by someone did not constitute an "em-
ployee organization"; there had to be some nexus between the employees. In Hamberlin v. VIP
Ins. Trust. 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977), the court also emphasized the fact that the solicited
employees came from a variety of businesses, and were thus not employee organizations.
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also be aided by the very broad definition of "employer" in section 3(5)
of ERISA:
The term "employer" means any person acting directly as an employer, or
indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an employee bene-
fit plan; and includes a group or association of employers acting for an em-
ployer in such capacity.74
Accordingly, if a MET could restructure its operations to include an
employer association with some involvement in the operation of the
arrangement, then it might conceivably win an argument based on the
literal words of the statute.75 In the most recent case in this area, one
MET came very close.76
On July 23, 1979, the DOL sent a letter to Thomas Wilkie, Adminis-
trator of the Insurance and Prepaid Benefits Trust (IBT), informing
him of the DOL's conclusion that IBT was not an employee welfare
benefit plan.77 The letter differed little from the standard DOL/MET
letter, reasoning that IBT had not been "established or maintained by
an employer. '7s
Wilkie, however, immediately filed suit in federal court challenging
the DOL conclusion. As brought out at trial, Wilkie represented the
new breed of MET operators who had made a conscious decision to
restructure his MET operation to exploit the loopholes in prior MET
cases. Prior to 1976, Wilkie had operated METs for licensed insurance
companies.79 In 1976, however, he formed IBT and thereafter began to
design the structure of IBT to fit within the ERISA definition of "em-
ployee welfare benefit plan." First, he separated IBT into five trusts in
order to group the subscribing employers into industry classifications.
He also formed a Benefit Committee for IBT by informing a few of the
subscribers of a September 1977 meeting to "reestablish" IBT. Officers
of two employers attended and became the only Committee members.
Shortly thereafter, another person joined the Benefit Committee, and
the three Benefit Committee members became trustees of IBT. In De-
74. ERISA § 3(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (1976) (emphasis added).
75. Ironically, the NAIC has warned Congress of just this possibility. See NAIC Tesimony,
supra note 26, at 661-62.
76. See Insurance & Prepaid Benefits Trust v. Marshall, 90 F.R.D. 703 (C.D. Cal. 1981), affd
mem. sub nor. Insurance & Prepaid Benefits Trust v. Donovan, 685 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1982).
77. Id
78. Id at 704-05.
79' See Appelle's Brief at 6, Insurance & Prepaid Benefits Trust v. Donovan, 685 F.2d 443
(9th Cir. 1982) (citing Record on Appeal) [hereinafter cited as Answering Brief].
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cember 1977, the newly appointed trustees voted to approve a five-year
agreement with Wilkie's company, Insurance Benefits, Inc. (IBI), to
provide for virtually all of the operation of IBT.80
The district court's subsequent opinion represented an encouraging
"loss" for METs. Although the court held that IBT was not an "em-
ployee welfare benefit plan," its reasoning and general approach
largely parallelled the IBT arguments. Most significantly, the court
grounded its analysis in the bare statutory language by holding that the
critical questions were whether: (1) IBT was "an association of em-
ployers"; (2) represented by the Benefit Committee; (3) which, in turn,
actually controlled the entire arrangement."' In the district court's
view, the first criterion was satisfied because the employers had "joined
together for a specific purpose"-namely, to provide health and welfare
benefits to their employees.12 The second criterion was satisfied be-
cause the participating employers were informed of the formation of
the Benefit Committee, invited to participate in its operation and there-
fore approved of the selection of the committee members.83 As to the
question of who controlled IBT, the court was "inclined to conclude
that the Benefit Committee controlled the affairs of IBT," but for the
IBT/IBI contract which gave control over all records and subscriber
information to IBI. This, the court reasoned, placed IBT "in a highly
disadvantageous position in its relationship with IBI" and led to the
ultimate holding that IBT was not an employee benefit plan.84
On appeal, the DOL, recognizing the danger of the district court's
reasoning, urged a much broader analysis. First, it attempted to place
the issue in its historical context by tracing the development of the law
in Congress and the courts.85 Instead of relying on the literal words of
the statute, the DOL emphasized the primary purpose analysis and
pointed out the danger of exempting these entrepreneurial profitmak-
ing ventures from state regulation-a result which, in the DOL's view,
was not intended by the "deemer" provision of section 514. Regardless
of the form of the restructured IBT, it was still primarily a vehicle for
allowing Wilkie to market his insurance products to a wide sector of
80. Id at 7-8.
81. Insurance & Prepaid Benefits Trust v. Marshall, 90 F.R.D. 703,706 (C.D. Cal. 1981), qgd
mere. sub nom. Insurance & Prepaid Benefits Trust v. Donovan, 685 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1982).
82. Id
83. Id
84. Id at 706.
85. See Answering Brief, ,upra note 79, at 14-22.
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the public, and was therefore not a nonprofit, limited purpose em-
ployee benefit plan serving only a closed group of employees.8 6
The DOL also disputed the court's analysis of the specific statutory
language. It pointed out that both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits had
held that an otherwise unrelated group of employers did not become an
"association" by subscribing to the same insurer.8 7 With respect to
Benefit Committee "representation" of the employers, the DOL cited
the testimony of IBT employers that they had no idea who the mem-
bers of the Benefit Committee were, as well as the testimony of the
Benefit Committee members that they too had no idea who the em-
ployers were and had no contact with them. 8
Finally, the DOL sharply disputed the district court's conclusion re.-
specting control of IBT. Even without the IBT/IBI contract, the DOL
argued that it made little sense to believe that Wilkie had ceded control
over IBT in 1977 to the three virtual strangers who became members of
the Benefit Committee. On the contrary, IBI made virtually all opera-
tional decisions and IBT's marketing literature given to employers em-
phasized IBI's experience without once mentioning the Benefit
Committee which supposedly controlled IBT. s9
86. Id
87. Id at 30 (citing Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., 617 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir.
1980); Wayne Chem. Corp. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977)),
The status of true "employer association" plans is one of the least commented upon areas of the
MET issue. Because of the inclusion of the "group or association of employers" language in the
ERISA definition of "employer," it is apparent that Congress contemplated that some employee
benefit plans would be organized around an employer association.
Prior to ERISA, those state insurance laws which had specifically exempted employee benefit
plans from coverage on this basis had generally limited "association of employers" to companies
under common control. See generally Goetz, supra note 60, at 327-28. The DOL has taken a
somewhat broader view for purposes of ERISA. Judging from the occasions upon which the DOL
has held that such an "association" exists, the critical factors seem to be that the organizational
impetus for forming the association came from the employers and that the associations exist for
purposes other than just to provide welfare benefits-in other words, the DOL has consistently
applied the primary purpose and organizational impetus tests and found that some associations
can meet that standard. See DOL Advisory Op. 81-76A (Oct. 14, 1981) (Texas Homebuilders
Association); DOL Advisory Op. 81-51A (June 9, 1981) (American Association of Petroleum
Landmen); DOL Advisory Op. 81-47A (May 28, 1981) (Iowa Bankers Association); DOL Advi-
sory Op. 81-6A (Jan. 5, 1981) (Michigan Dental Association); DOL Advisory Op. 80-68A (Dec. 1,
1980) (Professional Insurance Agents Association); DOL Advisory Op. 80-40A (July 9, 1980)
(Small Business Independent Trades Association); DOL Advisory Op. 79-49A (July 31, 1979)
(Florida Osteopathic Medical Association).
88. See Answering Brief, supra note 79, at 37 n.18.
89. Id at 33-37.
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The decision on appeal left neither party satisfied. Despite the
lengthy arguments made on the central issue of what constitutes an em-
ployee benefit plan in the MET context, the court essentially passed on
the question by holding that the district court had no jurisdiction over
the case in the first instance. Specifically, the court held that there was
no jurisdiction to review this DOL advisory opinion on the status of
METs under ERISA.90 Its only comment on the merits was that the
district court's conclusion that IBI, and not the Benefit Committee, con-
trolled IBT was not clearly erroneous.91
The court's holding on the reviewability of advisory opinions is con-
sistent with recent law in the Ninth Circuit, but not particularly consis-
tent with other case law.92 The practical significance of the opinion is
interesting, although clearly not intended by the court. On the one
hand, the DOL and IBT had differed in their initial pleadings on the
legal significance of the DOL's opinion. IBT had argued that the DOL
was obligated to "certify" employee benefit plans upon request in a
procedure somewhat analogous to the "qualification" of pension plans
by the Internal Revenue Service. 93 The DOL had argued that there is
no such procedure for welfare plans and, therefore, it was in no way
obligated even to respond to IBT.
The Ninth Circuit resurrection of this argument-and particularly its
holding of nomeviewability-may alleviate one of the problems of
MET enforcement. As noted, some state courts, and even some insur-
ance commissioners, believed that a DOL opinion, which stated that a
MET failed to meet the definition of employee benefit plan, was a pre-
requisite to state action. 94 By holding that such DOL opinions cannot
even be reviewed, the court certainly undercut any argument that there
90. Insurance & Prepaid Benefits Trust v. Donovan, 685 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1982) (mem.),
aj'g 90 F.R.D. 703 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
91. Id
92. Compare Boating Indus. Ass'n v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1979) with National
Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971) and Continental
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 522 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
93. The growth of pension plans has been aided by favorable tax treatment; in general, an
employer may deduct contributions to a pension plan and an employee may defer taxation on the
contributions as income until he receives a distribution. In return, Congress requires pension
plans to meet certain minimum standards which are now contained in Title H of ERISA. See
supra note 3. It is routine procedure for plans to obtain determination letters from the Internal
Revenue Service stating that the plan qualifies for favorable tax treatment. See 26 C.F.R.
§ 601.201(o) (1982); Rev. Proc. 80-30, 1980-1 C.B. 685; Rev. Proc. 80-24, 1980-1 C.B. 658.
94. See supra note 41.
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is a "certification" process for welfare plans akin to the "qualification"
process for pension plans.
If this aspect of the court's opinion represents a minor gain for MET
enforcement, its failure to address the merits represents a loss. The dis-
trict court's opinion was widely hailed in the MET community as a
victory because, despite the ultimate holding, the court accepted most
of the structural changes made by Wilkie to turn his MET into an em-
ployee benefit plan.95 Instead of a definitive opinion on METs which
could have followed the DOL argument that this restructured MET
still did not match the "primary purpose" prerequisite of employee
benefit plan status, the Ninth Circuit's opinion leaves that critical ques-
tion unanswered. Whether this opinion sparks a new wave of restruc-
tured METs is not yet apparent, but the potential surely exists.
B. Jurisdiction over METs under ERISA
As the foregoing material suggests, most of the attention in the MET
controversy has centered on state regulation of these entities. This sec-
tion focuses on a development that has apparently eluded the attention
of state regulators, and indeed, commentators as well. Until very re-
cently, the DOL enforcement program against METs had been virtu-
ally stopped in its tracks by a little-publicized decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.96
L The DOL Theory of ERISA Jurisdiction
Before discussing this decision and its subsequent history, however,
it is necessary to return to the beginnings of the MET problem in 1976
and 1977. The task for the regulators then seemed to be to find a way
to work around the "deemer" provision of section 514 in order to clear
the way for regulation of METs under state insurance laws. The DOL
solution was to devise a statutory interpretation that would provide
that METs were not "employee welfare benefit plans" under section
3(1) of ERISA. This, of course, eventually became the "established or
maintained by employers" analysis. Until the IBT decision, this
seemed to be a successful strategy, and no court had held that a MET
was an employee welfare benefit plan.
95. See Business Insurance 1, 26 (Aug. 3, 1981). Mr. Wilkie is quoted as saying, "We lost the
battle, but won the war. we're disappointed we didn't win hands down, but it was a tremendous
victory." Id at 26.
96. Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., 617 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 61:359
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss2/2
MULTIPLE EMPLOYER TRUST REGULATION
The "established or maintained by employers" analysis also seemed
to have the advantage of being designed for one specific question-
whether the MET itself was an employee benefit plan. Beginning in
1979, however, the DOL decided to give a more complete analysis-
one not strictly necessary for the specific question of the MET's status
under state law, but one certainly more accurate concerning federal
ERISA regulation of METs. Therefore, advisory opinions on METs
began to appear with something added to the usual analysis. After de-
claring that the MET itself was not a plan, the opinions went on to state
that, in the case of METs, the proper analysis was that each subscribing
employer had established its own plan. The MET, therefore, was not
itself a plan, but rather the funding vehicle for a number of smaller
plans, which were covered by ERISA.97
This was neither as contradictory nor as unprecedented as it might,
at first glance, seem. After all, the entire MET arrangement was
designed to provide health and welfare benefits to persons who were
employees of subscribing employers. Given the recurring expressions
of congressional intent in ERISA's legislative history to provide com-
prehensive protection to employees in the area of their health and wel-
fare benefits, it seemed apparent that ERISA should apply to METs in
some fashion. Moreover, there seemed to be no reason to treat employ-
ers subscribing to METs any differently from employers contracting
with insurance companies to provide benefits. The latter had always
been understood to have established employee welfare benefit plans.
Finally, this analysis did not jeopardize state regulation of the MET.
Just as a state could regulate an insurance company providing services
to an employee benefit plan, so could the states regulate a MET as a
service provider to plans.
2. The Taggart Decision
On May 30, 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided
Taggart Corp. v. Life and Health Benefits Administration.98 The sole
employee of Taggart Corporation had arranged health insurance for
himself and his family from a licensed insurance company through a
97. See, e.g., DOL Advisory Op. 81-84A (Dec. 9, 1981); DOL Advisory Op. 81-73A (Sept. 24,
1981); DOL Advisory Op. 80-IOA (Feb. 11, 1980); DOL Advisory Op. 79-54A (Aug. 5, 1979);
DOL Advisory Op. 79-46A (July 19, 1979); DOL Advisory Op. 79-41A (June 29, 1979).
98. Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., 617 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1980), aft'dsub
nonm Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., 617 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1980).
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MET.99 When the employee's wife made a claim for benefits, the in-
surance carrier denied the claim based on an alleged misrepresentation
in the insurance application." The employee then brought suit under
ERISA. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.10 1 The appellate court's reaction
to this suit became apparent in the opening sentence of its reasoning:
"Whether this insurance case belongs in federal court turns on whether
[the MET] is covered by [ERISA]."' 2 The court then proceeded to
dispose of plaintiff-appellant's contention that the MET was itself an
employee welfare benefit plan. This portion of the opinion set out in
conclusory, but accurate, terms the arguments against this proposition,
stating that the MET was a "proprietary enterprise, established and op-
erated by independent businessmen for their personal profit"; 0 3 that it
was marketed to "hundreds of unrelated subscriber customers"; 1°4 and
that it had not been established by employers as required by the section
3(1) definition of employee welfare benefit plan.105
Up to this point, there was nothing unusual about the opinion. But
when the court turned to a discussion of the DOL's expanded MET
theory-that Taggart Corporation had established its own individual
employee benefit plan when it subscribed to the MET- 0 6 the court
broke new ground in the interpretation of ERISA. It stated: "Consid-
ering the history, structure and purposes of ERISA, we cannot believe
that that Act regulates bare purchases of health insurance where, as
here, the purchasing employer neither directly nor indirectly owns,
controls, administers or assumes responsibility for the policy or its ben-
efits." 107 The reasoning in support of this conclusion was, at best,
sketchy. First, the court pointed out that most of ERISA deals with
pension plans.108 It then reasoned that the alleged plan had no assets
and was not in the form of a trust."° Therefore, there were no assets to
99. Id at 1210.
100. Id
101. Taggert [sic] Corp. v. Efros, 475 F. Supp. 124 (S.D. Tex. 1979).




106. The DOL filed an amicus curiae brief in the case.
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be protected by ERISA." The court also cited section 105 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code which supposedly distinguishes between "acci-
dent or health insurance" and "accident or health plan[s]," and
concluded from this provision that "ERISA 'plans' are broader in con-
cept than pure insurance transactions of the sort involved here.""'
In the final paragraph of its short opinion, the court expressed no
concern about its decision. The lack of jurisdiction under ERISA, the
court reasoned, did not mean that plaintiff-appellant could not pursue
its "insurance claims in an appropriate state court."' 1 2
3. The Implications of the Taggart Decision on Coverage of
Employee Welfare Beneft Plans under ERI"SA
A fair summation of the holding of the Taggart opinion is that an
employer who merely purchases insurance to fund health and welfare
benefits, and who thereafter does not exercise control over the adminis-
tration of the contract, has not established an employee welfare benefit
plan within the meaning of ERISA. Although this analysis was prof-
fered in the MET context, it presumably would apply to all types of
welfare plans. The problem with this analysis can be stated quite sim-
ply--the overwhelming majority of wefare plans in America fit that
descriotion. Approximately 92% of the 1.5 million companies with
health and welfare plans purchase insurance to fund benefits,' " and
89% of these employers exercise little or no control over the administra-
tion of the plan." 1
4
a. The Purchase of Insurance
The words of the statute and its legislative history repeatedly make
mention of the fact that ERISA-covered welfare plans are created
through the purchase of insurance. The most significant statutory lan-
guage is in the section 3(1) definition of employee welfare benefit plan
which specifically states that covered plans may be funded "through
the purchase of insurance." Moreover, six other statutory provisions
assume that employee welfare benefit plans involve insurance.15
110. Id
I11. Id
112, 617 F.2d at 1211.
113. See II BATTELLE STUDY, supra note 12, at 80.
114. See IV BATTELLE STUDY, supra note 12, at 42.
115. See § 103(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(a)(2) (1976) (requiring an insurance company "which
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In fact, this aspect of ERISA reflects the common understanding of
how plans have been funded since at least the passage of the predeces-
sor statute to ERISA-the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act
of 1958 (WPPDA). 116 The Senate Report explaining the WPPDA defi-
nition of "employee welfare benefit plan," which is virtually identical
to that of ERISA, notes that: "[m]ost employee welfare plan benefits
are insured with a commercial insurance company or the Blue Cross-
Blue Shield type of operation.""' 7 Partially in reliance on this legisla-
tive history, one of the few reported decisions under the WPPDA held
that where an employer collected employee contributions, added com-
pany contributions and remitted these amounts for Blue Cross-Blue
Shield coverage for those employees, the employer had established an
employee welfare benefit plan."'
The legislative history of ERISA indicates that Congress not only
was aware of this issue under the WPPDA, but also was concerned that
the same controversy not jeopardize coverage of employee benefit
plans under ERISA. As one House Report states, one of the objectives
of ERISA was to extend the protections of the Act in situations in
which the extent of existing law had been unclear:
First, a number of plans are structured in such a way that it is unclear
whether the traditional law of trusts is applicable. Predominantly, these
are plans, such as insured plans, which do not use the trust form as their
mode of funding. Administrators and others exercising control functions
in such plans under the present Act [the WPPDA] are subject only to
minimal restrictions .... 119
In light of the language and legislative history, it is virtually indisputa-
ble that Congress not only was aware of the insured nature of most
plans, but also fully intended to subject such plans to ERISA. 20 Both
provides some or all of the benefits under the plan" to provide information for reporting pur-
poses); i d § 103(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(e) (1976) (requiring disclosure if "some or all of the benefits
under the plan are purchased from and guaranteed by an insurance company"); id. § 401(b)(2), 29
U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2) (1976) (describing requirements applicable to assets of a plan which consists
of insurance contracts); id. § 408(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § I 108(b)(5) (1976) (rules concerning the
purchase of "life insurance [or] health insurance" by certain plans).
116. 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (1958) (repealed by ERISA).
117. S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4137, 4143.
118. Wirtz v. Gulf Oil Corp., 239 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
119. Employee Security Beneft Act of1974: Material Explaining H. 12906 Together with Sup.
plemental Views, 120 CONo. REc. 3977 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Explanatory Material].
120. In this connection, see Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 78 (Ist Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978). The issue in that case was whether a state law mandating that all
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before and after the Taggart decision, the commentators' 21 and
courts' 22 had consistently found ERISA coverage of insured plans.
b. The Degree of Employer Involvement in Administration of
the Plan
The second major reason advanced by the Taggart court in support
of its holding was the lack of significant employer involvement in the
day-to-day administration of the employee benefit plan. In other
words, the court held, without supporting commentary, that Congress
intended to subject to ERISA only those benefit arrangements adminis-
tered by employers.
There is nothing in the section 3(1) definition of employee welfare
benefit plan which supports this conclusion. The specific language is
that the plan be "established or maintained" by the employer (or union
or both). Even if it could be said that "maintained" is the equivalent of
"administered,"1 23 the section quite clearly is phrased in the disjunc-
tive. Other statutory provisions confirm the fact that Congress assumed
that persons other than the sponsoring employer often do all of the
administrative work in connection with covered plans. 2 4 In fact, these
third-party administrators have testified before Congress concerning
insurance companies must provide psychiatric care benefits was preempted by ERISA as indirect
regulation of the employee benefit plan which purchased policies from those companies. The
court held that the exception from ERISA's preemption provision for state laws regulating insur-
ance sustained the applicability of that law. In its reasoning, the court stated that "Congress was
fully aware of the functions and scope of employee benefit plans" and cited the inclusion of fund-
ing by § 3(1) of ERISA "through the purchase of insurance" as proof that Congress knew that
most plans are funded through that method.
121. See, e.g., Little & Thrailkill, Fiduciaries Under EJJSA: A1 Narrow Path to Tread, 30
VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (1977); Comment, ERJS/1 Preemption and Indirect Regulation of Employee
Welfare Plans Through State Insurance Laws, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1536, 1537 (1978).
122. See Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (Ist Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978);
Corley v. The Hecht Co., 2 E.B.C. 2397 (D.D.C. 1982); Austin v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 498
F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Ala. 1980); Lederman v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1020 (C.D.
Cal. 1980); Cate v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 434 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).
123. But see Feinstein v. Lewis, 477 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aft'd 622 F.2d 573
(2d Cir. 1980) (court held that "maintained" is the equivalent of "funded").
124. For example, ERISA § 3(16), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16) (1976), defines "administrator" as the
plan sponsor or "the person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which
the plan is operated." Similarly, ERISA § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (1976) defines "party in
interest" to include the "employer" as well as the "administrator." ERISA § 103, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1023 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), requires disclosure by each covered plan of a change in administra-
tor. None of these provisions is consistent with the notion that Congress thought that the em-
ployer administered all covered plans.
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ERISA, t25 and have been involved in numerous cases arising under
ERISA without a single court taking the position that the presence of
third-party administration has defeated ERISA coverage. 126
Assuming, therefore, that "established" does not mean "adminis-
tered," the question becomes what sort of action must an employer take
to "establish" a plan. It has been demonstrated that in the MET area
the DOL has used the employer (or union) establishment requirement
to exclude METs on the theory that the organizational impetus comes
from the MET entrepreneur and not the employees. But, this reading
of the "established" requirement has no relevance to the question of
whether the employer "establishes" an individual plan which then sub-
scribes to the MET to administer benefits. On this individual plan
level, the DOL always has viewed this language as primarily intended
to distinguish between purchases of health insurance by individuals for
themselves and such purchases by employers on behalf of a class of
employees.1 27 Viewed from this perspective, the "established by" lan-
guage results only in a requirement that welfare benefits be provided
by some action of an employer acting to benefit a class of his
employees. 128
125. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1976):
The great bulk of small plan sponsors are small business; businesses which have neither
the in-house facilities nor the expertise to undertake the administrative and actuarial
tasks necessary to properly establish and maintain an employee benefit plan. Accord-
ingly, they retain firms like those represented by our association to handle all aspects of
administrative and actuarialfunctions, ranging from assistance in initial plan design to the
full scope of continuing administration.
Id (emphasis added).
126. See, e.g., Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 72 (1st Cir. 1977) (plaintiff described as
the "administrators of various health and welfare funds which provide benefits chiefly through the
purchase of group health insurance"), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978); Delaware Professional
Servs. Corp. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, 2 E.B.C. 2041 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (plaintiff
was administrator of prepaid health and dental care programs for employee welfare benefit plans);
Boyer v. J.A. Majors Co. Employees Profit-Sharing Plan, 481 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Bar-
rett v. Thorofare Markets, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Carter v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 76 F.R.D. 565 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).
127. See, eg., 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-10) (1982), which specifically excludes from coverage certain
insurance arrangements where, among other things, a promoter solicits employees, not employers,
and where the only involvement of the employer is, without endorsing the program, to permit the
promoter to publicize the program to employees. Similarly, another regulation, codified at 29
C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(b) (1982) excludes from coverage any arrangement whereby an individual
causes his sole proprietorship or wholly-owned corporation to purchase benefits for himself as the
"employer's" sole "employee."
128. This distinction may partially explain the reluctance of the Taggart court to find cover-
age. In Taggart, the alleged plan had only one participant--the corporation's president and sole
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c. The Significance of the Structure of the Plan Arrangement
The most fundamental error of the Taggart decision is its emphasis
on the structure of the benefit arrangement as the determining factor in
the question of coverage. To a certain extent, this may have been
caused by the prior emphasis on the MET as an employee benefit plan.
But, in the case of an insured MET (as in Taggart), there are three
distinct structural entities operating on different levels. There is the
entity at the employment level, the intermediate funding vehicle which
is the MET itself, and the insurance company underwriting the bene-
fits. The fact that one or more of these entities cannot be considered
employee benefit plans (in this case, the insurance company and MET)
does not mean that there are no covered plans. Title I of ERISA is
essentially a labor-relations statute and it is on the employer-employee
level where one could expect plans to be found.
The difficulty that arises in most welfare plan cases is that there is
typically no formal written "plan" on the employment level-the em-
ployer generally simply signs a contract to provide benefits to his em-
ployees. But, this lack of a formal structure is not fatal. The first proof
of this hypothesis lies in the phrase, "plan, fund, or program" in section
3(1). The use of the disjunctive suggests that Congress was not overly
concerned with structure. Indeed, the courts have consistently held
that this language expresses congressional intent to cover any proce-
dure utilized by an employer to provide the benefits described in sec-
tion 3(1), whether or not the procedure is memoralized in a separate
document.129 More specifically, the common understanding of "pro-
gram" is "a plan or procedure for dealing with some matter."'
' 30
employee. While that "employee" was only a minority shareholder of the corporation, thereby
avoiding the exclusion from ERISA coverage provided in the DOL regulation, 29 C.F.R.
§ 2510.3-3(b) (1982), the Taggart court plainly had difficulty in accepting the notion that "the
corporation" had made a decision to provide health benefits to its lone officer and worker, as
opposed to the individual purchase of insurance through the corporate guise excluded by the
DOL's regulations defining an ERISA-covered plan. That the court apparently perceived this as
an attempted elevation of form over substance is shown by its characterization of the alleged
corporate decision as one made "patently for tax reasons." See 617 F.2d at 1211.
129. For example, the courts have unanimously held that a few sentences in an employer's
policy manual to the effect that an employee is entitled to severance pay to be paid out of the
employer's general assets constitutes an "employee welfare benefit plan" under ERISA. See
Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Pinto v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 480 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. I. 1979); Donnelly v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 696 (E.D.
Pa. 1979).
130. WEaSTER's NEw WORLD DICTIONARY 1135 (2d ed. 1974).
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Viewed only on the level of employer-employee relations, it is difficult
to believe that an employer subscribing to a MET could be thinking of
anything more than establishing a program for providing welfare bene-
fits for his employees. Furthermore, if a prospective employee were to
ask the employer whether the company had a program for the provi-
sion of health benefits, it is hardly likely that the answer would be
"no."
This statutory language of a "plan, fund, or program" also refutes
the reasoning in Taggart that an employer does not establish a covered
plan by subscribing to the MET because the alleged plan is not in the
form of a trust.131 Even if the court were correct about the requirement
of a trust, however, it seems to have overlooked one critical fact-the
subscribing plans to a MET are cast in a trust form. To be sure, each
plan does not embody a separate trust, but the plans do participate in a
commingled trust fund--the MET itself. It is not at all uncommon in
either the pension or welfare plan area for banks, insurance companies
or others to offer participation in commingled trust funds as a means of
funding benefits for the individual subscribing plans.' 32 There is also
no question that Congress was well aware of this fact when it enacted
ERISA. 13
3
When the MET is viewed in relation to other commingled trusts, the
DOL theory that each subscriber establishes its own plan does not ap-
pear to be unprecedented. On the contrary, one of the ironies of the
prior preoccupation with the status of the MET under state law is that
the Taggart court lost sight of the fact that the same persons who were
131. See Cummings, Purposes and Scope of Fiduciary Provisions Under the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of(1974, 31 Bus. LAW. 15 (1975):
We ought to keep in mind several points with respect to this definition [of employee
welfare benefit plan]. First, it is much broader than any other definition heretofore used
in this context, either with respect to tax or disclosure. Second, it does not require a fund
at all, but may simply involve a program....
Id at 19.
132. This is known as a "master plan" in the pension area. It operates exactly as a MET
operates in the welfare plan area; that is, the commercial entity establishes a single trust or custo-
dial account in which all the employers adopting the master plan participate. There is no question
that each subscriber establishes its own covered plan although there is only one trust. See Mar-
shall v. Carroll, 2 E.B.C. 2491 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1980), a.f'd, No. 80-4361 (9th Cir. Feb. 11,
1982); 1 PENs. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 17,004.
133. The ERISA Conference Report states: "The conferees understand that it is common
practice for banks, trust companies and insurance companies to maintain pooled investment funds
for plans- .. " H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 316, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONo.
& AD. NEws 5038, 5096 [hereinafter cited as Conference Report].
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arguing that the MET is not the plan itself also had generally added
that the MET subscribers had themselves established covered plans.
This includes the DOL well before its change in its advisory opin-
ions,134 the NAIC,t35 and the House Oversight Committee. 136 Indeed,
the existence of ERISA-covered plans within the MET arrangement
had been assumed by the large insurance companies which had first
formed METs. t37
In short, the Taggart court's fundamental misperception was its be-
lief that how a plan is funded or administered determines its coverage.
Once again, a close reading of the section 3(1) definition of employee
welfare benefit plan establishes the essential irrelevancy of those struc-
tural characteristics. The only language dealing with structure other
than the "plan, fund, or program" phrase discussed above is the re-
quirement that the benefits be provided "through the purchase of insur-
ance or otherwise." It is difficult to accord any interpretation of the
134, See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-21 (1982), originally proposed on August 3, 1976. It provides a
limited exemption from the reporting requirements of ERISA for welfare plans "which [have]
fewer than 100 participants ... are part of a group insurance arrangement. . . and provid[ed]
benefits to the employees of two or more unaffiliated employers." Id
135. See Brummond, supra note 20, at 734. At the time of the article, the author was counsel
to the NAIC.
136, As noted, the House Oversight Committee had concluded that state insurance law could
apply to the MET itself and is not preempted by ERISA. The concluding portion of the Commit-
tee's analysis is not as well known: "To the extent that such [METs] fail to meet the definition of
an 'employee benefit plan,' state regulation of them is not preempted by section 514, even though
such state action is barred [by ERISA § 514] with respect to the plans which purchase these
products.""
Oversight Report, supra note 57, at 10 (emphasis added).
137. In hearings concerning proposed ERISA regulatory action jointly conducted by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service and DOL in February 1977, Daniel Knickerbocker, Vice-President of the
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, stated:
In still another case involving a great many small plans, these may be operated under
some kind of master trust arrangement. I am not talking only of the master trust and
prototypes which are used in welfare plans; and [an] insurance company in order to
establish such arrangements may establish the trust, appoint the trustee or trustees and
its salesmen will make available the participation in this trust to many, many small em-
ployee groups.
The groups are, in fact, groups of three to 49 employees. We have one such trust in the
John Hancock, for instance, that. . . we established. There are 3,200participating em-
ployers and their plans. And the coverage is afforded to some 23 and a half thousand
employees.
In the Matter of Hearing On Proposed Class Exemption For Insurance Agents and Brokers, Etc. at
161 (unpublished transcript available at Department of Labor) [hereinafter cited as DOL
Hearings].
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latter phrase other than a congressional direction that structural details,
at least in the area of funding, are not relevant.
If the existence of an ERISA-covered welfare plan depended on how
it is operated, each change in operation could put the coverage issue
into dispute. More seriously, a focus on funding mechanisms could
lead to a finding of noncoverage for plans which no one would dispute
were subject to ERISA. For example, there could not be a serious
question of the coverage under ERISA of plans set up in collective bar-
gaining and jointly administered by employees and unions. The
Supreme Court has held that such plans "must comply with the de-
tailed and comprehensive standards of the ERISA,"' 38 and the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that ERISA is "incontesta-
bly" applicable to these plans.1 39 But, if such a plan were to subscribe
to a MET, the logic of the Taggart reasoning would lead to a holding
that no coverage existed. In sum, an analysis which focusses exclu-
sively on how a benefit arrangement is funded or administered will in-
evitably lead to absurd and inconsistent results.
4. The Dillingham Decision
While the Taggart case was pending in the Fifth Circuit, the DOL
filed a complaint in another MET case. In Donovan v. Dillingham,140
the defendants were the trustees of a MET and certain other entities
owned and operated by them. While a motion to dismiss the complaint
was pending, the Fifth Circuit decided Taggart and the district court
thereupon dismissed the complaint.
By the time the case on appeal was submitted for oral argument, the
new Eleventh Circuit had been created. This fact, however, did not
change the status of Taggart as controlling precedent in Dillingham. In
its first en banc decision, the new Eleventh Circuit announced that it
would follow the rules on precedent adopted by the Fifth Circuit. 41
This meant that the new circuit would be bound by decisions of the
Fifth Circuit issued prior to October 1, 1981, and that no panel could
issue an opinion contrary to a previous panel decision of the Fifth
Circuit.
138. UMW Health & Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562 (1982).
139. Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 1979).
140. Donovan v. Dillingham, 668 F.2d 1196 (1 ith Cir.), rev'd, 688 F.2d 1367 (1 lIth Cir. 1982)
(en banc).
141. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en bane).
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Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit panel in Dillingham atfirmed the
district court's dismissal of the DOL complaint solely on the authority
of Taggart. Its brief opinion discussed only one point: the rejection of
an attempt to distinguish Taggart on the ground that the alleged plan
there had really been a disguised individual purchase of insurance by
the corporation's sole employee. 142
The DOL thereupon filed a petition for rehearing en banc-the only
way to remove the controlling significance of Fifth Circuit decisions in
the Eleventh Circuit.' 43 The court granted the petition and, in a deci-
sion with far-reaching significance for the future of METs, held that
there is subject matter jurisdiction under ERISA for complaints against
the promoters of METs.
The decision is a well-reasoned refutation of the essential holding in
Taggart. In contrast to Taggart, the Eleventh Circuit examined in de-
tail the section 3(1) definition of employee welfare benefit plan. Start-
ing with the "plan, fund or program" language, the court held that a
covered plan "implies the existence of intended benefits, intended ben-
eficiaries, a source of financing, and a procedure to apply for and col-
lect benefits."' 44 Where these factors are reduced to writing, a plan
would clearly exist.' 45 The court held, however, that coverage under
ERISA does not depend on the existence of "a formal, written plan."'"
As noted, this is significant because the subscribers to METs, and in-
deed employers who purchase insurance, do not ordinarily write up a
formal plan for themselves. In welfare plans the MET trust document
and insurance policy usually are the only written instruments. The
court specifically held that these sources can be looked at to ascertain
whether a plan exists. '41
According to the court, coverage ultimately depends on evidence of
"events that record, exemplify or implement" an employer's deci-
sion.' 48 These include "financing or arranging to finance or fund the
intended benefits, establishing a procedure for disbursing benefits,
142. Donovan v. Dillingham, 668 F.2d 1196, 1198 (1Ilth Cir. 1982), rev'd, 688 F.2d 1367 (1 1th
Cir. 1982) (en banc).
143. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1210 (1lth Cir. 1981) (en bane).
144, Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1982).
145. Id
146. Id
147. Id at 1372-73.
148. Id at 1373.
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[and] assuring employees that the plan or program exists. . . 149 In
this connection, the court took exception to the views of Taggart on
insurance funding. Instead of treating purchases of insurance as a fac-
tor militating against ERISA coverage, the court held that "the
purchase of a group policy or multiple policies covering a class of em-
ployees offers substantial evidence that a plan, fund, or program has
been established."1 50
The court then applied this standard to the facts of the case. It held
that the purpose of the subscription to the MET was to provide benefits
to participants,'51 that the intended beneficiaries constituted a class of
employees or union members,' 52 and that the subscribing employers
financed those benefits "under circumstances tending to show an antici-
pated continuing furnishing of such benefits. .. .
The final section of the opinion dealt with Taggart. The court distin-
guished Taggart on precisely the same ground that the panel earlier
rejected. Thus, the court held that the alleged plan in Taggart was ac-
tually an individual purchase of insurance by the corporation's sole
employee.154 The court did, however, state that the reasoning of Tag-
gart "encourages too broad an interpretation,"155 and concluded:
[11f Taggart implies that an employer or employee organization that only
purchases a group health insurance policy or subscribes to a MET to pro-
vide health insurance to its employees or members cannot be said to have
established or maintained an employee welfare benefit plan, we disagree.





151. Id at 1374.
152. Id
153. Id at 1375.
154. Id
155. Id
156. Id The status of Taggart in the Fifth Circuit is now unclear. It remains to be seen
whether the circuit will also distinguish Taggart on the basis that the alleged plan there was really
an individual purchase of insurance. Considering that the author of Taggart, Judge Hill, was part
of the unanimous Dillingham court, it would appear likely that the Fifth Circuit will in some
subsequent MET case take the same approach to Taggart the Eleventh Circuit has.
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III. THE FUTURE OF MET REGULATION
A. Introduction
The foregoing traced the somewhat tortuous development of legal
principles establishing the jurisdiction of the states and federal govern-
ment over METs. Despite some lingering uncertainties, it appears
likely that the courts will adopt the general reasoning that a MET is not
an employee benefit plan (and is thus not excluded from state regula-
tion by the ERISA "deemer" provision), but that the individual sub-
scribing employers do establish such plans (which are thus subject to
ERISA). In short, both state and federal law have roles to play in the
area of METs.
Nevertheless, little has been accomplished in the past five years. In
going after METs under state insurance laws, there is an impressive
amount of case law holding that a MET is not an employee benefit
plan, but that is not the same thing as saying that a MET is an insur-
ance company. Considering the variation in state insurance laws,
METs may be insurance companies in some states, but not in others.
Once that question is settled, the more important question of how the
insurance law should be enforced against METs arises. Moreover, the
same questions can be applied to regulation of METs under ERISA.
Assuming the court in Dillingham has effectively overruled Taggart
and cleared the way for the DOL to enforce ERISA against METs,
there is still no law on how ERISA should be interpreted in the MET
area. The next two sections examine the probable contours of future
regulation of METs under state, and then federal law.
This future regulation will also be affected by MET legislation en-
acted during the final session of the Ninety-Seventh Congress. This
legislation responds 'to many of the problems uncovered by Congress in
its hearings, and should be a benefit to state and federal enforcement
officials, particularly on the issue of jurisdiction over METs. Neverthe-
less, while the intent of the legislation is clear, the actual language is
ambiguous and does not address many of the difficult unresolved issues
in this area.
Therefore, the legislation will not clear up the MET area. That will
require better coordination of state and federal law. Although it is
hardly unprecedented for both state and federal law to apply to a par-
ticular situation, ERISA and state insurance laws proceed from two
very different premises. In the third section of this Part, a framework
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for applying both state and federal law in a coordinated fashion is
developed.
At that point, the final and perhaps the most difficult problem shall
be considered-devising a practical enforcement strategy. As the his-
torically rocky relationship between the NAIC and DOL illustrates,
very little progress has been made on this score. Therefore, the con-
cluding section of this article makes detailed recommendations for an
effective, coordinated enforcement strategy.
B. The Status of the MET under State Insurance Law
. Insurance Law Generally
For many years courts have held that the business of insurance is
subject to substantial state regulation.157 Undeniably, insurance is a
business with which the states have always had a "special relation."
158
Correspondingly, states have been granted the authority to control who
engages in the business of insurance. Knowledge of the conditions
under which insurance companies may operate in a given state dictates
company policy.' 59
Although yielding varied results, state insurance laws do contain
protections in two general categories: One regulates the "relationship
between insured and insurer."' 60 Underlying this category is the ap-
proval of the policy to be issued,' 6' the rates to be charged, 62 subse-
quent interpretation of the policy,' 63 and the selling and advertising of
policies.'" Grouped together in the other category of laws are the sol-
157. See, e.g., California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 109-10
(1951); Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972).
158. See, e.g., Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 65 (1940).
159. See Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 4 Cal. App. 3d 21, 84 Cal.
Rptr. 88 (1970); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 244 Wis. 429, 12 N.W.2d 696 (1944) aft'd,
324 U.S. 154 (1945).
160. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969).
161. The NAIC has promulgated a model law in the health coverage area. See Uniform Indi-
vidualAccident and Sickness Policy Provirions Law, in I NAIC PROCEEDINGS 414 (1950). Thirty-
two states have adopted this law. See Official N4IC Model Insurance Laws, Regulations and
Guidelines, at 10-3 (1980), [hereinafter cited as Model Laws]. See generally Henson &
Obenberger, Mail Order Insurers: 4 Case Study in the Ability of the States to Regulate the Insur-
ance Business, 50 MARQ. L. REV. 175, 182-86 (1966).
162. See, e.g., SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969); Henson & Obenberger,
supra note 161, at 182-86.
163. Henson & Obenberger, supra note 161, at 185.
164. Id See also FTC v. National Causalty Co., 357 U.S. 560, 564 (1958) (per curiam); Kim-
ball & Jackson, The Regulation of Insurance Marketing, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 141 (1961). All states
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vency of insurers and the requirements for, among other things, initial
capitalization, surplus accounts, reserves and investments. 165 In short,
the state "has a legitimate concern with the financial soundness of com-
panies writing insurance contracts with its citizens,"' 166 and is charged
with maintaining control "against fly-by-night operators and the
grosser forms of profiteering and financial mismanagement all too
common in unregulated insurance activity. '' 167
2. Resolving the Question of METs and the Business of Insurance
Armed with the record of MET insolvencies and the resulting inabil-
ity to pay claims for medical expenses, 168 one could argue that the
traditional state concern with the solvency of insurers is quite apt for
METs. Realizing that the general purpose of insurance law can be, or
perhaps even should be applied to METs does not, ipso facto, mean
that METs are engaged in insurance. Doubtless, the state regulators
must still show that the activities of the MET fit within the definition of
insurance used in that state.
Unfortunately, this is not a simple task because most states lack a
statutory definition of insurance.'6 9 Nevertheless, there are certain
principles which have been identified as characterizing insurance. As
noted, the primary function of insurance is to assume the risk of a con-
tingency by spreading that risk over a large class of similarly situated
persons.170 Each of these factors may be said to be present in a MET:
the promised health and welfare benefits are provided only when an
employee becomes ill or disabled; the MET is solely responsible for
compensation in the event the contingency of sickness or accident
arises; and the provision of a mechanism for risk distribution is the
overriding reason for the existence of the MET.' 71 Other attributes of
the typical insurance relationship also exist. It is recognized that em-
regulate marketing practices, most of them pursuant to another NAIC model law. See All Industry
Fair Trade Practices Act, in I NAIC PROCEEDINGS 150 (1960); ModelLaws, supra note 161, at 20-
22.
165. See general) Henson & Obenberger, supra note 161, at 190-91; Annot., 17 A.L.R.4th 16
(1982).
166. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 158 (1945).
167. Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440, 458 (1946).
168. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
169. See Goetz, supra note 60, at 321.
170. See I COUCH, INSURANCE § 1.3 (2d ed. 1959).
171. See Brummond, supra note 20, at 706-09.
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ployers have an "insurable interest" in the lives and health of their em-
ployees.1 72 From the perspective of the employer and employee, the
MET has made a "legally binding promise" to provide benefits in the
case of valid claims. The existence of such a "legally binding promise"
generally indicates the presence of a bona fide insurance contract.'73
For the most part, the weight of authority in the decided cases indi-
cates that METs are in the business of insurance. Unfortunately, how-
ever, no court has yet articulated a convincing rationale for such a
holding. On the federal level, the courts have been more concerned
with whether the MET is an employee benefit plan. Once that has been
determined, the court either assumes that the MET is in the business of
insurance 74 or the MET declines to make the further argument that it
is not.175 There has been considerably more activity in state courts, but
most of the decisions involve unpublished opinions, decisions without
hearings, or brief memoranda on preliminary motions.
76
Those states which make the most careful distinctions about insurers
have had difficulty with this issue. Prominent among them is Califor-
nia. According to Mr. Damon, Chief Deputy Commissioner for Cali-
fornia, METs are not considered to be insurers under that state's
laws. 177 Although Damon did not articulate the basis for his conten-
tion, it is likely that the structure of particular METs raises the possibil-
ity that they are not insurers.
For many years, courts have drawn distinctions among entities in-
volved in the health care area. The leading case in this area is Jordan v.
172. "Insurable interest" refers to the requirement that the actual purchaser of insurance be
subject to a risk of loss if the insured suffers some injury. See, e.g., R. KEETON, supra note 17, at
§ 3.5(b); W. VANCE, supra note 18, at 156-208.
173. Hellner, supra note 17, at 498.
174. See, e.g., Wayne Chem. Corp. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692, 699-700
(7th Cir. 1977).
175. See, e.g., National Business Conference Employee Benefit Ass'n v. Anderson, 451 F.
Supp. 458, 459 (S.D. Iowa 1977) (court noted that the MET admitted that there was no distinction
between it and a health insurance company).
176. See, e.g., Washington Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Texas, 545 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)
(conclusory statement that MET was either an insurance company itself or agent for reinsurers
and thus was subject to state law in any event). See also Arizona v. Barry, No. C341253 (Ariz.
Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 1976) (temporary restraining order); People v. 3133 Group Benefit Trust, No.
727-751 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 1977) (same); Colorado v. Kuhre, No. C-69407 (Colo. Super. Ct.
Sept. 27, 1977) (consent decree); Georgia v. Marketing Consultants of the South, Inc., No. 93840
(Ga. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 1977) (temporary restraining order).
177. See March Hearings, supra note 7, at 57.
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Group Health Association.78 The defendant there was a corporation
which solicited members who each paid a monthly fee. If the sub-
scriber needed health care, the Association arranged for providers to
deliver that care. According to the court, the Association did not guar-
antee to pay the subscriber's bills; there would not be a charge to the
subscriber only if the Association could find a provider that would
charge through the Association.17 9 In the court's view, the purpose of
the insurance code was not to "regulate all arrangements for assump-
tion or distribution of risk,"'8 and this particular arrangement was bet-
ter characterized as a "consumer cooperative" engaged in the mass
purchase of medical care. 18'
This reasoning has been used to exclude many entities which operate
without technically indemnifying subscribers against loss from medical
contingencies. Instead of providing indemnification, these entities are
considered to be "service organizations."'' 82 Thus, to the extent a MET
may not assume the ultimate risk of loss, but rather agree to use its best
efforts to find a provider who will agree to be paid through the MET, it
may not be considered to be in the business of insurance. Although
figures on this are not currently available, the experience in California
indicates that at least some METs may be cast in that form. 183
178. 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
179. Id at 246-47.
180. Id at 248.
181. Id at 247-48.
182. See generali Fechteler v. Jordan, 218 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (per curiam); J. AP-
PLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE §§ 699-700 (1948).
The best known example of these "service" entities are the various Blue Cross/Blue Shield
organizations. While the actual practice of these entities may not differ from traditional insurers,
most states have separate statutes outside the insurance code which regulate their activities. See
generally Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice is Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 887, 972-82 (1971). Another variant of this "indemnity vs. service" distinction for insur-
ance regulation purposes involves so-called health maintenance organizations which are also gen-
erally regulated by states outside the insurance code. See generally Anderson, HMO's and The
Insurance Industry: From Strangers to Friends to... 4 22 A. OF LIFE INS. COUNS. PROC. 795
(1972).
183. This distinction between insurers and nonindemnifying health care plans has compli-
cated California's enforcement effort considerably. Under California law, health care plans which
do not technically indemnify against loss are regulated by the Commissioner of Corporations and
not the Commissioner of Insurance. Thus, when California attempts to enforce its laws against
METs, it sometimes brings separate suit under both laws. For example, see the complaint filed by
the Insurance Commissioner against American Benefits, Ltd., No. C426549 (Superior Court for
County of Los Angeles) and the companion suit by the Corporations Commissioner against the
same MET, No. C426533 (Superior Court for County of Los Angeles).
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3. The Possibility of Special MET Legislation
The problem of nonindemnifying METs under traditional state in-
surance law raises the question whether states should enact special leg-
islation to clarify the status of those entities under state law. Indeed,
some representatives of METs have urged that the states enact such
special legislation.1 8 4 There are, however, some risks to this approach.
The first is the ERISA preemption provision. In this context, the
critical question is a more sophisticated variant of the previously dis-
cussed issue of whether a MET is an employee benefit plan itself which
cannot be "deemed" an insurer because of ERISA section 514(a)(2)(B).
Even if the MET is not a plan itself (but rather a funding vehicle for
individual subscribing plans), it could be argued that state regulation of
the MET is precluded because such regulation "relates to" the sub-
scribing plans within the meaning of section 514(a) generally.
This line of argument is particularly troublesome for state laws
outside the insurance code because such laws cannot take advantage of
the exclusion from the preemption provision for laws regulating insur-
ance. One example is the legislation enacted by California apart from
the insurance code, for health care service plans which do not techni-
cally exercise the insurance function of "indemnifying" the covered in-
dividual against loss. 185  One court already has held that this law is
preempted by ERISA, 86 and while that holding can be limited some-
what, 18 7 it does suggest that state efforts to regulate METs outside the
insurance code may be subject to preemption by ERISA as indirect
regulation of the ERISA-covered plans which subscribe to the MET. 8
184. See de Heuck Letter, supra note 21.
185. See Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 1340 to 1399.64 (Deering 1982).
186. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aft'd, 571 F.2d
502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
187. In Hewlett-Packard, the plaintiffs were not METs, but true employee benefit plans estab-
lished by employers to serve a closed group of their employees. Moreover, the application of the
Knox-Keene Act to them would have necessitated changes in their structure and operation. The
district court held that the state law was preempted. It declined, however, to explore the "outer
boundaries of ERISA's preemption provision" or to discuss the permissibility of state regulation
over non-employee benefit plan providers of health care services to plans. 425 F. Supp. 1295,
n.lO.
188. The courts' hostility to special legislation which may have an impact on plans is illus-
trated by Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Cal. 1981). There, the
court held that the California common law of fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress
was not preempted by ERISA, but California statutes affording remedies for defrauded consumers
and unfair business practices were preempted. This holding appears to have resulted from the
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Inclusion of special MET legislation in the insurance code, however,
may not be a guarantee of safety from preemption. Since most plans
purchase insurance to fund benefits, it is relatively easy for states to
affect employee benefit plans by changing their insurance laws. This
issue was litigated in Wadsworth v. Wlhaland. s9 At issue was a state
insurance law compelling licensed insurance companies to offer mental
health coverage in all health policies. The court held that this law "re-
late[d] to" employee benefit plans which purchase insurance to fund
benefits, but was saved from preemption because it was a law regulat-
ing insurance. On the other hand, the insurance industry, 190 employee
benefit plan community,19' and commentators generally 92 have argued
that these laws do not regulate insurers as much as they indirectly regu-
late employee benefit plans. Efforts to undercut Wadsworth judi-
cially' 93 and legislatively 194 are underway. If successful, even the
validity of state insurance regulation which is perceived to be aimed at
court's deference to the "judge-made" common law over "legislation-made" law-a distinction
that does not appear in the ERISA preemption provision. See ERISA § 514(c), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(c) (1976), which defines "state law" as including all laws, regulations and decisions.
The scope of ERISA preemption of state laws with peripheral effect on plans is unclear. For
example, another judge in the same California court which decided the Provience case has held
that California common law claims are preempted by ERISA. See Ziskind v. Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n, 3 E.B.C. 1012 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 1982). The same inconsistencies plague other courts.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit has held that the administrative inconvenience for plans compelled to
honor state court community property divisions does not constitute a sufficiently direct effect to
mandate preemption. The same court has also held that administrative inconvenience does com-
pel preemption for state efforts to collect income taxes. Compare Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740 (9th
Cir. 1980) (no preemption), cert. denied sub nom. Seafarer's Int'l Union v. Stone, 453 U.S. 922
(1981) with Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 679 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.
1982), vacated on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 2841 (1983). See generally Note, ERISA Preemption of
State Law: The Meaning of "Relate To" in § 514, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 143 (1980).
189. 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978).
190. See generally Okin, Federal Preemption ofState Law Under ERISA: An Examination of
the Effects of the Federal Mandate in the Light ofAuthoritative Precedent Under the Supremacy
Clause, the McCarran-Ferguson Act & the Legislative History, 24 A. OF LIFE INS. COUNS. PROC.
115 (1976); Younger, Mandated Insurance Coverage--the Achilles Heel ofState Regulation, 24 A.
OF LIFE INS. COUNS. PRoc. 765 (1978).
191. See Hearings on S. 2125 Before the Subcomm on Labor ofthe Senate Commt on Human
Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 543 (1977) (testimony of ERISA Industry Committee).
192. See Manno, ERISA Preemption and the McCarren-Ferguson Act: The Need/or Congres-
sional Action, 52 TEMPLE L.Q. 51 (1979); Note, ERISA Preemption and Indirect Regulation of
Employee Welfare Plans Through State Insurance Laws, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1536 (1978); Com-
ment, Regulation ofEmployee Welfare Benefit Plans: The Scope f ERISA's Preemption and the
State Power to Regulate Insurance, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV. 177 (1979).
193. This attempt failed before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts which held that, although
it was wary of an approach which would allow states to regulate plans through their insurance
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regulating employee benefit plans that purchase coverage from insurers
could be questioned.
There are indications, however, in ERISA and its legislative history
that Congress intended to accord states responsibility over special types
of insurers that might not be technically "insurance companies" under
state law.195 But, there are two reasons why states should be cautious
about special MET legislation beyond the possible preemption
problems. First, METs compete against conventional insurers, and
there certainly has been no showing that they are entitled to less com-
prehensive control than their competitors. Thus, the states should be
cognizant of the competitive effect on insurance companies of special-
ized MET legislation. 9 6 The second reason for caution is the effect
MET legislation would have on the enforcement of ERISA. Under-
standing this issue, however, necessitates a discussion of the future reg-
ulation of METs under ERISA.
laws, a Massachusetts insurance law similar to that at issue in Wadsworth was not preempted. See
Attorney General v. Travelers Ins. Co., 385 Mass. 598, 433 N.E.2d 1223 (1982).
The insurance industry had considerably more success in Maryland, where an intermediate
appellate court held that a minimum benefit insurance law of that state was preempted by ERISA.
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 51 Md. Ct. Spec. App. 122, 441 A.2d 1098
(1982). Interestingly, this court reasoned that ERISA § 514's exclusion of laws regulating insur-
ance from preemption "is not devoid of obscurity and free from ambiguity when applying it to a
particular law." Id at 1457.
194. Legislation has been introduced to overrule Wadsworth, but has never moved beyond the
committee stage. See, e.g., S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 927, 930-48 (1979). The
current thinking in Congress is unclear. In discussing recently-enacted legislation overruling prior
case law holding that a Hawaiian health care statute was preempted by ERISA, Congressman
Erlenborn, ranking minority member on the House Committee of Education and Labor, cau-
tioned that the legislation was not "intended in any way either to overturn or endorse the deci-
sion" in Wadsworth. He added that "[r]esolution of that issue should be dealt with in separate
legislation after a full opportunity for both sides to present their views." See 127 CoNo, REc.
H9609 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1982).
195. First, there is the language of the deemer clause of the preemption provision. It refers to
state laws regulating an "insurance company or other insurer." ERISA § 514(a)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a)(2)(B) (1976). This provision corresponds to the definition of "insurer" in ERISA
§ 401(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2)(A) (1976), which includes within that term "an insurance
company, insurance service, or insurance organization, qualified to do business in a State." The
legislative history indicates that this broad definition was intended to cover non-indemnifying
health service organizations which may technically not be considered insurance companies under
various state laws. See Conference Report, supra note 133, at 297.
196. The insurance industry has expressed considerable concern for the competitive advan-
tages currently accorded METs because of the absence of state regulation applicable to insurers
generally. See October Hearings, supra note 29, at 37; Okin, supra note 190, at 178. The Supreme
Court has also noted the need for equal treatment under state law of competitors in the insurance
area. See Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940).
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C. The Fiduciary Provisions of ERISA and Their Impact on METs
At the outset, it is necessary to discuss again how METs are struc-
tured. The MET is a trust fund which holds moneys contributed by
employers (and occasionally employees) to provide health and welfare
benefits. The promoters of the MET generally are the trustees of this
trust; even if they are not, they enter into arrangements with the trust to
provide administrative services. In the case of insured METs, the pro-
moters also choose the insurance company to underwrite the benefits.
In uninsured METs, the promoters design benefit and contribution
levels and provide for payment of claims out of the trust. The promot-
ers' compensation comes from the trust either in the form of fees for
service or sales commissions.
In Dillingham, the court declined to comment on whether the MET
promoters, who were also the trustees of the MET trust fund, were
fiduciaries under ERISA.197 The expansive ERISA definition of "fidu-
ciary" would, however, seem to apply to these promoters; in the words
of the statute, they exercise both "discretionary authority or discretion-
ary control respecting management of [the] plan" or "authority or con-
trol respecting management or disposition of its assets."' 98 Indeed, the
legislative history of ERISA t9 9 and a significant amount of case law2"
197. Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d at 1375.
198. See ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (1976).
199. See, e.g., Explanatory Material, supra note 119, where the House Committee noted that
one of the deficiencies of prior law was that, in the case of insured plans, "[a]dministrators and
others exercising control functions in such plans under the present Act are subject to only minimal
restrictions." Senator Bentsen, arguing to the Senate in favor of the passage of ERISA, noted a
case which "precipitated much of the original Congressional interest in Federal legislation impos-
ing fiduciary standards on pension and welfare funds." 120 CONG. REC. 29951 (1974). The case
involved a trustee who misappropriated thousands of dollars from money contributed to pay ben-
efits by forming his own "management firm to administer these funds." Id
200. In Marshall v. Robbins, No. 79-20008 (7th Cir. 1980), the court held that the selection of
a claims administrator is a fiduciary function under ERISA and that the trustees with the power to
make that choice must comply with the fiduciary provisions of ERISA. In Marshall v. Snyder,
572 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1978), the court approved the appointment of a receiver based, in part, upon
allegations that a trustee had diverted money contributed to pay welfare benefits to himself
through the plan's contract administrator which he controlled. In Gilliam v. Edwards, 492 F.
Supp. 1255 (D.N.J. 1980), the court held that a union business manager who participated with
others in the decision to appoint himself as the administrator of a welfare plan violated ERISA
because, among other things, the contract was "markedly one-sided." And, in Brink v. DaLesio,
496 F. Supp. 1350 (D. Md.), rev'd in part, 88 F.R.D. 610 (D. Md. 1980), af'd in part, 667 F.2d 420
(4th Cir. 1981), the court held that a person who selects an insurance company to fund welfare
benefits is a fiduciary subject to ERISA. See also Eaton v. D'Amato, 3 E.B.C. 1003 (D.D.C. 1980)
(administrator as fiduciary).
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would support the proposition that these promoters must comply with
the fiduciary provisions of ERISA.
Unfortunately, the analysis is not quite as simple as it may appear
because Congress and the DOL have enacted special rules in the fiduci-
ary area concerning insured plan arrangements. The first category of
such rules deals with the concept of "plan assets." In the case of the
ordinary insured welfare plan-where the employer simply purchases a
group insurance policy-it would appear from the ERISA definition of
"fiduciary" that the insurance company owes fiduciary obligations to
the plan. But, Congress provided in ERISA section 401(b) that, where
a plan purchases a "guaranteed benefit policy"2"1 from an insurer, the
premiums paid by the purchaser cease to be "plan assets" when they
reach the insurer. Therefore, the insurer need not comply with the
fiduciary provisions when it makes decisions concerning disposition of
its assets, notwithstanding that those assets came from employee benefit
plans covered by ERISA.
This is when the status of METs as "insurers" under state law comes
into play. On the strength of the argument that contributions to METs
funding health benefits are functionally indistinguishable from premi-
ums paid to insurance companies for the same purpose, it could be held
that the MET should not be considered to be holding "plan assets."
But, neither the statute nor the DOL proposed regulations would sup-
port this reasoning. ERISA section 401(b) carefully confines this ex-
emption to plans where a policy is "issued" by an "insurer," that, as
noted, is defined as an "insurance company, insurance service, or insur-
ance organization, qualified to do business in a state." Thus, an unin-
sured MET could not take advantage of this exemption because it is, by
definition, not licensed as an insurance company by a state. An insured
MET fails under this provision, as well, because it (as opposed to its
insurer) does not "issue" any insurance contracts. Thus, to the extent
states enact special legislation to deal with METs, they must be aware
that that legislation may carry with it the seeds for excluding MET
promoters from ERISA's fiduciary provisions.20 2
201. This term is defined as "an insurance policy or contract to the extent that such policy or
contract provides for benefits the amount of which is guaranteed by the insurer." See ERISA
§ 401(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1 101(b)(2)(B) (1976).
202. The DOL has commented that the "plan asset" exemption for a licensed insurer was
based on a Congressional recognition that such an entity "is subject to state regulation designed to
assure the entity's ability to pay benefits specified in the policies when due." See 44 Fed. Reg.
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The inapplicability of section 401(b) to METs does not end the "plan
asset" problem. Consider, for example, the case of a plan purchasing
stock directly from a company. That stock obviously is a plan asset,
and its value is dependent upon the efforts of the company's manage-
ment to realize earnings from the plan's investment. Does this mean
that the company's managers are fiduciaries with respect to the plan's
investment? According to the DOL, it does not. In proposed regula-
tions defining "plan assets," the DOL has taken the position that,
where a plan purchases stock of an "operating company," it merely
exchanges one plan asset (cash) for another (stock), and only the latter
is to be considered a plan asset.20 3
This issue is relevant to METs: the MET may argue that the sub-
scribing plans are merely exchanging one asset (cash contributions) for
another (the right to receive benefits).2° Therefore, the argument
would continue, the MET promoter does not hold plan assets and
could do anything with them as long as there is fulfillment of the con-
tractual (not fiduciary) pledge to deliver promised benefits. If the pro-
moter is considered to be holding plan assets, however, a fiduciary
obligation extends well beyond the promise to provide benefits-any
surplus not needed to pay benefits would still have to be held for the
exclusive benefit of the subscribers.20 5
The answer to this problem lies in an examination of the arrange-
ment as a whole. It could be argued that the subscribers are only inter-
ested in purchasing the right to receive benefits and do not expect to get
anything more. But, the MET promoter is not just selling that product;
there is also the sale of expertise in administering and managing a ben-
efit plan arrangement. Indeed, the MET promoter is essentially operat-
ing a commingled trust fund designed to underwrite employee benefits,
and the law on this subject holds that operators of such funds are plan
50,363, 50,364 (1979). Therefore, specially enacted MET legislation will have to be tested against
this standard.
203. See 45 Fed. Reg. 38,084, 38,085 (1980).
204. This analysis finds some support in the ERISA § 401(b) plan asset exclusion for insurers.
The section provides that plan assets in the case of insured arrangements include the insurance
policy or contract, but do not include the assets of the insurer. Thus, Congress seems to have
treated a purchase of insurance by a plan as an exchange of assets (money for policy).
205. As one court has stated: "The language of ERISA makes abundantly clear that plan
monies, whether in the nature of a surplus or not, shall be applied for the exclusive benefit of the
participants and beneficiaries of the plan." Marshall v. Snyder, 255 PENS. REP. (BNA) D-8, D-12
(ED.N.Y. 1979).
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fiduciaries.20 6 Finally, whatever doubt there might be on this issue
should be resolved by emphasizing one central fact about METs-they
are designed as trusts. Thus, to hold promoter-trustees to a fiduciary
responsibility could hardly come as a surprise.
The "plan asset" problem is not the only fiduciary issue raised by
METs. Even assuming that ERISA's fiduciary provisions apply to
MET promoters, there is a further question of how these provisions,
particularly the self-dealing and conflict of interest provisions of ER-
ISA section 406207 should be interpreted.
As a general matter, the ERISA fiduciary provisions codify the com-
mon law of trusts, 20 "including the familiar requirement of undivided
loyalty to beneficiaries. ' 209 This is apparent from the language of ER-
ISA section 404, which commands that each fiduciary "shall discharge
his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries and. . . for the exclusive purpose of. . . providing
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries. 2 t°
The requirement of absolute loyalty set forth in ERISA section 404
corresponds to the identical long-established principle of the common
law of trusts.211 After nearly a decade of hearings on the special
problems faced by employee benefit plan participants and beneficiaries,
however, Congress saw the need for expansion of the common law in a
number of critical areas.212 One such area was in the relationship of
206. See 1 PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 5691; DOL Hearings, supra note 137. The Conference
Report on ERISA also states that persons who operate commingled trusts "are, of course, plan
fiduciaries." Conference Report, supra note 133, at 316.
207. ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1976).
208. See Conference Report, supra note 133, at 306.
209. Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 457 (10th Cir. 1978). See also NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453
U.S. 322 (1981):
[U]nder principles of equity, a trustee bears an unwavering duty of complete loyalty to
the beneficiary of the trust, to the exclusion of the interests of all other parties .... To
deter the trustee from all temptation and to prevent any possible injury to the benefici-
ary, the rule against a trustee dividing his loyalties must be enforced with "uncompro-
mising rigidity." Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (Cardozo,
C.J.). A fiduciary cannot contend "that, although he had conflicting interests, he served
his masters equally well or that his primary loyalty was not weakened by the pull of the
secondary one." Woods v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 269.
453 U.S. at 329-30 (citation omitted).
210. ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976).
211. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUST § 170 (1959); H. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES
§ 543 (rev. 2d ed. 1978).
212. See Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1979), where the court prefaced its analysis
of a case presenting § 406 issues by noting: "It is important to understand that this case involves
no taint of scandal, no hint of self-dealing, no trace of bad faith. . . Uncontradicted testimony
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plans to those persons whose ties to the plan or its fiduciaries were so
close that they raised the possibility that plan assets might be used on
their behalf. The solution chosen by Congress was simple, but far-
reaching. First, it adopted a comprehensive definition of who consti-
tutes an "insider" or "party-in-interest" to the plan in ERISA section
3(14).213 These "parties-in-interest" include any fiduciary, service pro-
vider to the plan, employer or union employing or representing any
participant. In addition, the statute contains a series of attribution
rules which include in "party-in-interest" status owners, relatives, em-
ployees, officers, directors, and partners of the above general categories.
Having identified who is a party-in-interest to a plan, Congress next
provided per se prohibitions of certain transactions between plans and
those parties. ERISA section 406(a) generally provides that a fiduciary
may not engage in any transaction which involves an exchange of as-
sets or property between a plan and a party-in-interest. 21 4 Once a court
makes the determination that fiduciaries have engaged the plan even
indirectly in a transaction with parties-in-interest in any of the ways set
forth in section 406(a), its inquiry is essentially over and a violation has
occurred.215
This provision causes problems for METs and the insurance industry
generally because it is customary for both to provide multiple services
to plans. For example, MET promoters typically serve as trustees of
the MET trust fund, as well as providing administrative services. In
the insurance industry generally, brokers will typically advise plans on
the purchase of insurance in exchange for a commission-arguably
making them fiduciaries under ERISA 2 t6-and also provide other serv-
ices. Since these MET promoters and insurance agents or brokers are
parties-in-interest, the literal language of ERISA section 406 would
seem to preclude any compensation from the plan for these services.
before the district court established that the terms of the transaction were fair and reason-
able. , .." Nevertheless, the Cutaiar court had no trouble in finding that a violation had oc-
curred, reasoning that "Congress intended to create an easily appliedperse prohibition of the type
of transaction" specified in § 406. Id at 529. See also Brink v. DaLesio, 496 F. Supp. 1350 (D.
Md. 1980); M&R Inv. Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 484 F. Supp. 1041 (D. Nev. 1980), a7'd, 685 F.2d 283
(9th Cir. 1982); Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
213. See ERISA § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (14) (1976).
214. ERISA § 406(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a) (1976).
215. See supra note 212.
216. The ERISA definition of "fiduciary" in § 3(21)(A) includes any person who "renders
investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys
or other property" of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1976).
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The DOL has recognized that it is often, as a practical matter, essen-
tial or at least beneficial for plans to allow multiple services by persons
who may be considered fiduciaries. ERISA provides two methods for
modifying the strictures of section 406, and the DOL has used both to
grant relief in this area. First, the DOL has used its rulemaking au-
thority217 to issue regulations interpreting ERISA section 408(b)(2).
This provision contains an exemption from section 406 allowing plans
to contract with parties-in-interest for services.21 8 In the specific area of
insurance agents and brokers, the DOL has issued a "class exemp-
tion '2 9 allowing these entities to provide services to plans for a fee.220
Both regulatory efforts allow for the performance of multiple services
to employee benefit plans, provided the compensation and contractual
arrangements are reasonable, and that a fiduciary independent of the
contracting person approves the arrangement.
The future application of ERISA's fiduciary provisions to METs will
evolve from these standards. Thus, the courts will be looking at the
cost and form of the MET promoter's relationship to the plans sub-
scribing to the MET. At a minimum, all service and compensation pro-
visions will have to provide for termination on reasonably short notice
without penalty.22' The compensation for services must be "reason-
able," but the DOL has not provided much guidance as to what that
means.2 22 Neither of these requirements, however, should cause much
problem for the honest MET promoter.
The requirement for approval by an independent fiduciary is another
matter because, in theory, someone independent of the service pro-
vider, who is fully subject to the fiduciary provisions, is required to
provide an independent check on the arrangement. As a practical mat-
ter, however, there are no fiduciaries in the typical MET other than the
217. See ERISA § 505, 29 U.S.C. § 1135 (1976).
218. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2 (1982).
219. ERISA § 408(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (1976), grants two kinds of exemptive authority to
the DOL. The first is authority for an individual exemption covering one specific transaction.
The second is authority to exempt a class of transactions from § 406. The standard for both types
of exemptions is the same-it must be administratively feasible, in the interest of participants and
beneficiaries, and protective of the latters' rights.
220. See Amendment of Prohibited Transaction Exemption 77-9, 44 Fed. Reg. 1479 (1979).
221. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(c) (1982).
222. The § 408(b)(2) exemption discusses "reasonable compensation" by referring to another
regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408c-2 (1982). The referenced regulation, however, is not particu-
larly enlightening. It states that what is reasonable "depends on the particular facts and circum-
stances of each case." Id
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promoters.223 This would suggest that most METs are in structural vio-
lation of ERISA, even if their compensation arrangements are
reasonable.
L The Coordination of Federal and State Enforcement
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, both state and federal law can
apply to METs. There are significant differences, however, between
these two legislative schemes. Insurance law focuses on the MET entity
itself as an insurer and its relationship to the insured, while ERISA
focuses on the promoter as a fiduciary and his relationship to the trust
beneficiaries. This requires consideration of the proper coordination
between the laws.
a. Protecting the Employer's Expectation of Health Coverage
State insurance law is best suited to assuring that employees will ac-
tually receive the benefits promised by the MET. The law operates on
two levels: it attempts to assure the solvency of the insurer, and it pro-
vides effective remedies for failure to pay benefits.
Virtually all states require insurers to fulfill certain financial require-
ments as a condition to conducting business within that state. In the
words of one noted commentator, "It is thus not surprising that all sys-
tems of insurance regulation regard the financial solvency of the insur-
ance enterprise as the central aim, for if nothing else, insurance must
insure .'224 Thus, to the extent the states are successful in subjecting
uninsured METs to the financial solvency requirements of their laws,
considerable protection may be afforded to employees in assuring that
benefits will be paid.
Another significant attribute of state insurance regulation is its reha-
bilitative and protective mechanisms upon insolvency. State insurance
commissioners generally are accorded wide-ranging powers to prevent
223. See DOL Hearings, supra note 137. The question whether the employer who establishes
a plan by subscribing to a MET is a fiduciary is troublesome. The law thus far distinguishes
between "settlor" or "sponsor" action by the employer and "fiduciary" action by him. Where the
employer only establishes the plan and does not thereafter play a role in administering it, he is not
a fiduciary. See Boyer v. J.A. Majors Co. Employees Profit-Sharing Plan, 481 F. Supp. 454 (N.D.
Ga. 1979); Barrett v. Thorofare Markets, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Carter v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 76 F.R.D. 565 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). Cf. Robinson v. UMW Health & Retire-
ment Fund, 455 U.S. 562 (1982).
224. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of
Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 480 (1961) (emphasis in original).
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loss upon insolvency. These include the power to put a company into
receivership and marshal sufficient assets to pay claims.2 25 On a more
informal level, states are often successful in finding insurers who are
willing to loan money or pick up coverage for insolvent insurers-an
approach that Illinois has used effectively in protecting the benefits of
some victims of MET insolvency. 226
The fiduciary provisions of ERISA also provide some assurances in
the area of solvency. Under ERISA, the MET promoter as a fiduciary
is commanded to manage a plan's assets "with the care, skill, prudence,
and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent
man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use
in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like
aims. 22 7 At a minimum, this would seem to require the MET fiduci-
ary to design the enterprise in a way calculated to provide assurances
that 'benefits will be paid. Nevertheless, this general provision is
neither as direct nor as developed as the solvency requirements of state
law. To date, the DOL has brought only a few cases on the application
of the "prudence" requirement to plan funding decisions, and none
could be considered directly analogous to the kind of analysis required
to assure the solvency of METs.228
On the level of the individual claim for benefits, state law again pro-
vides more effective redress than ERISA. Such claims traditionally
have been handled in state courts, and Congress no doubt intended that
practice to continue.229 More significantly, although Congress also in-
tended to provide access to federal court for individual participant
claims,230 the courts have been reluctant to take jurisdiction over what
225. See Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1980); Washington Am. Life Ins. Co. v. State,
545 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
226. See March Hearings, supra note 7, at 6.
227. ERISA § 404(a)(l)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(B) (1976).
228. The cases brought by the DOL have involved the choice of insurance funding for welfare
plans, and specifically, whether death benefits should be funded through the purchase of whole
life or term insurance. See Donovan v. Smith, No. 82-1325 (E.D. Pa.); Donovan v. Tricario, No.
79-914-Civ.-JWK (S.D. Fla.); Donovan v. Gordon, No. 79-5574-Civ.-JWK (S.D. Fla.); Donovan
v. Rubin, No. 78-5749-Civ.-JAG (S.D. Fla.).
229. See ERISA § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1976), which provides for exclusive fed-
eral court jurisdiction over all claims under ERISA except for suits by participants involving their
own benefits under the plan; these suits may also be brought in state court.
230. Id See also ERISA's Findings and Declaration of Policy, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1976),
which states that one of the purposes .of the Act was to provide participants and beneficiaries
"ready access to the Federal courts."
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is perceived to be typical claims under state insurance law.231
This judicial attitude is best illustrated by comparing the district
court and appellate court opinions in the Wayne Chemical case.232 The
plaintiff there sought payment of a claim for medical expenses from a
MET. The district court held that this claim could be pursued under
ERISA, but was then compelled to fashion a "federal common law" to
justify judgment for the plaintiff.233 On appeal, the court reached the
same result by employing state insurance law. It held that the MET
was an unauthorized insurer under Indiana law; that the defendant in-
surance agent had assisted in the procurement of the unauthorized in-
surance; and that it was therefore liable to the insured under state
law.2 34
In sum, despite the theoretical existence of remedies for protecting
employees' expectations under ERISA, state insurance law provides
more direct, effective and developed remedies in this area.
b. Protecting the Public Against Unscrupulous MET Promoters
DOL enforcement of ERISA is best suited to preventing individual
MET promoters from continuing illegal activities once they have been
found to be untrustworthy. This is particularly true in the area of in-
sured METs, where a licensed insurance company provides assurance
of benefit payment, but the MET administrator may engage in preda-
tory practices from his position as a fiduciary that siphon off trust as-
sets. Although states have occasionally expressed interest in such
administrators,235 the NAIC has conceded that the existence of a li-
censed insurer in the arrangement dampens their enthusiasm for regu-
lating the administrator. 36
By contrast, the essential thrust of ERISA is the prevention of abuse
of fiduciary position,237 whether that occurs in the insured or uninsured
231. See Austin v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Ala. 1980); Eversole v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 318 PENS. REP. (BNA) D-8 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Lederman v. Pacific Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1020 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Cate v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 434 F. Supp.
1187 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).
232. Wayne Chem. Corp. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind.),
modjfed, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977).
233. Wayne Chem. Corp. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind.
1977), modjfed, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977).
234. See Wayne Chem. Corp. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977).
235. See NA4IC ModelAdmnistrator Statute, I NAIC PROCEEDINoS 319-21 (1977).
236. See supra note 20.
237. See supra notes 199-223 and accompanying text.
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context. In addition, because of the ERISA exemption for administra-
tive services, 238 the DOL has developed considerable expertise in this
area. Indeed, the DOL has brought numerous cases involving the pro-
priety of particular administrative fee structures.239
Even in the case of uninsured METs, where the states have consider-
able interest, the state regulators have shown an inability to prevent
individuals from continuing illegal activities. This is primarily the re-
sult of the MET "rollover" phenomenon--once a state has stopped a
particular MET, it is often powerless to prevent the promoter from
starting a new MET somewhere else.24° The best prospective mecha-
nism available to a state in this area is its authority over the agents
upon whom most METs rely to sell their coverage. While the states
possess considerable authority over agents,241 and portions of that au-
thority are quite helpful in the MET area,242 the agents themselves
point to some convincing practical and equitable considerations which
militate against state concentration on agents as a vehicle for solving
the MET problem.243
As a general matter, however, the problems faced by state regulators
in policing METs are the same as those which prompted the passage of
ERISA. The legislative history of ERISA indicates that concern for
multi-state abuse of welfare plan arrangements provided one of the
compelling reasons for regulation on the federal level.z4 Pursuant to
238. See supra note 218.
239. See Marshall v. Snyder, 572 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1978); Marshall v. Knee, No. C-3-77-93
(S.D. Ohio, Dec. 30, 1977), and the complaints recently filed in Donovan v. Nave, No. 82-C-2210
(N.D. Ill.); Donovan v. Abercrombie, No. C82-343A (N.D. Ga.).
240. See supra note 36.
241. See FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958); Robertson v. California, 328
U.S. 440 (1946); Travelers Health Ass'n v. FTC, 298 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1962).
242. As noted, some states provide that an agent is liable for benefits if it placed coverage with
an unauthorized insurer. See supra note 234. In the area of agent marketing, the state regulators
have called attention to the advertising material of some METs which mention ERISA in an
attempt to give its plan an aura of government approval. See NAIC Testimony, supra note 27, at
657. Most state laws prohibit sales materials which suggest governmental affiliation. See gener-
ally Henson & Obenberger, supra note 161, at 194.
243. Stephen Shaw, President of the California Association of Life Underwriters, testified
before Congress that an agent who has sold coverage to METs becomes "the person in the mid-
dle." He ordinarily has had no access to financial information, can expect little information from
the states, and is often misled by the MET as to its insured status. See October Hearings, supra
note 29, at 36-37.
244. See, e.g., Hearings Before the House Comm ofEducation andLabor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
703, 723 (1970) (testimony of the Commissioner of Insurance for Wisconsin) (noting the need for
federal legislation "in certain enforcement areas that normally would be beyond the effective
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its enforcement powers under ERISA, the DOL is clearly authorized to
seek injunctions against MET promoters245-injunctions which can
cross state lines.
2. The Effect of MET Legislation by Congress
In the waning days of the Ninety-Seventh Congress, the Congress
passed legislation aimed at closing the loopholes in MET enforce-
ment.246 The bill amended ERISA in several respects. First, it added a
new section 3(40) to the definitional provisions of Title I for "multiple
employee welfare arrangements"-essentially METs.2 4 7  It then
amended the preemption provision by adding a new section 514(b)(6).
This section provides that any employee benefit plan which is a multi-
ple employee welfare arrangement, whether insured or not, must com-
ply with state insurance laws to the extent such laws set standards for
reserves and contribution levels. In addition, uninsured arrangements
must also comply with the full range of insurance laws to the extent
they are not inconsistent with ERISA. The DOL has been granted au-
thority to exempt uninsured arrangements from this latter requirement,
but even with an exemption, the arrangement must comply with the
state's standards for reserves and contribution levels. Finally, the legis-
lation clarifies that subscribers to a MET are employee benefit plans
covered by ERISA, which should remove any doubts concerning ER-
ISA applicability remaining after Dili'ngham.
These amendments are drafted in such a way to discourage METs
from litigating the ERISA preemption question. For example, each
mention of employee welfare benefit arrangement is preceded by the
reach of the states."). See also Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1972) (testimony of Manuel Cohen, former Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission) (concerning the inadequacy of state enforcement mechanisms: "I
was a member of a Presidential Committee and ... we heard from state administrators, state
officials who indicated in their opinion they were unable to cope with all the problems ... ").
This is also true with respect to state enforcement mechanisms other than insurance regulation.
As one House Committee stated, "the applicability of present state laws to employee benefit plans
is sometimes unclear," and "reliance on conventional trust law often is insufficient to adequately
protect the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries." 120 CONG. REc. 3977, 3983 (1974).
245. See ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1976).
246. H.R. 5470, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CoNG. REc. H9604-05 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1982).
247. The term is defined to mean "an employee welfare benefit plan, or any other arrange-
ment (other than an employee welfare plan), which is established or maintained for the purpose of
offering or providing any benefit described in paragraph (1) [the existing definition of "employee
welfare benefit plan"] to the employees of two or more employers (including one or more self-
employed individuals), or to their beneficiaries." Id at H9605.
Number 2]
Washington University Open Scholarship
410 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
term "employee benefit plan." This leaves a MET wishing to contest
state jurisdiction with Hobson's choice. If it wishes to escape coverage
under the amendments, it must argue that it is not an "employee bene-
fit plan"; yet, METs traditionally have tried to argue that they are such
plans to escape state regulation. If the MET claims to be an "employee
benefit plan," it would then be subject to state insurance law in some
fashion pursuant to the new amendments. The primary accomplish-
ment of the legislation is its removal of the barriers to state examina-
tion of METs.
There are, however, many questions left unanswered by the legisla-
tion. First and foremost, the bill does not give much guidance concern-
ing enforcement of various state laws, particularly those laws outside
the insurance code for "non-indemnifying" health care plans. The ex-
planation of the bill by Congressman Erlenborn defines these laws
broadly,24 but the actual language of the legislation refers only to "any
law of any state which regulates insurance. '2 49 Moreover, it is not at
all clear which state insurance laws could be applied to all insured or
DOL-exempted METs. The legislation singles out standards, including
reserves, which the entity "must meet in order to be considered under
such law able [sic] to pay benefits in full when due." 250 Whether this
would include initial capitalization requirements or restrictions on in-
vestments is not clear. The legislation also does not clarify the ability
of the states to tax these entities in order to finance their enforcement
efforts.
More generally, the bill underscores the fragility of the entire pre-
emption concept. For those multiple employer arrangements which are
true employee benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA, that is,
those that are established by employer associations without the pres-
ence of the third-party profit-seeking entrepreneur who stands behind
most METs25 '--this legislation removes protection from state law regu-
lation. Presumably, these entities which are uninsured may be granted
exemptions by the DOL, but even in that case, a state may impose cer-
tain standards of their laws upon them. In short, the MET legislation
248. In discussing the requirements applicable to non-DOL exempted uninsured METs, Con-
gressman Erlenborn states that these entities would be subject to "whatever State-law [which] may
apply to them." Id at H961 1.
249. H.R. 5470, § 202(b)(6)(A)(ii), 128 CONG. REc. at H9605.
250. H.R. 5740, § 202(b)(6)(A)(i)(1), 128 CONG. Rmc. at H9605.
251. See supra note 82.
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represents the first example of a Congress moving away from exclusive
federal regulation of all employee benefit plans.252
3. DOL-NAIC Enforcement Strategy
Seventy-one years ago, Roscoe Pound observed:
[T]he means of making legal rules effective ... has been neglected al-
most entirely in the past. We have studied the making of law sedulously.
It seems to have been assumed that, when made, law will enforce itself
.... But the life of the law is in its enforcement. Serious scientific study
of how to make our huge annual output of legislation and judicial inter-
pretation effective is imperative.253
In the final analysis, the real difficulties arising from METs represent
proof that seventy years have not changed the essential accuracy of Mr.
Pound's observation.
There are impressive legal mechanisms available to both the states
and the DOL in enforcing their respective laws against METs. What is
missing is not so much the single legislative stroke that will clear up the
problems, but a realization on the part of all concerned that paramount
attention must be paid to coordinating the regulatory response of both
the states and the DOL.
First and foremost, there must be a change in attitude among regula-
tors. Recent testimony of state regulators before Congress indicates
that at least as much time is spent identifying the DOL as an enemy as
is spent discussing METs. Yet, not one insurance official even seemed
to be aware that the DOL enforcement program against METs had
been stymied by the Taggart decision. At the same time, it is clear
from this testimony that the DOL has not paid sufficient attention to
helping the states. While federal-state conflicts in insurance areas are
hardly new,254 there is nothing that prevents these two complementary
systems of regulation from working together effectively.
For example, the DOL has specific authority under ERISA to make
252. As noted, the same bill which deals with METs also overrules a major preemption case to
allow Hawaii's mandatory health care law to operate. Seesupra note 194. Having set this prece-
dent, it may be difficult for Congress to resist further efforts to allow particular state laws to
operate.
253. Pound, The Scope and Pirpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 489, 514
(1912).
254. See FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958); Henson & Obenberger, supra
note 161.
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cooperative arrangements with the state insurance commissioners.255
But such arrangements must be based on a thorough understanding of
the differences in laws. Without that understanding, the current think-
ing at the DOL is to consider delegation of investigative authority
under ERISA to the states.256 Although this may accord with the cur-
rent Administration's concepts of federalism, that same lack of under-
standing backfires as state officials are not familiar with ERISA, and
more important, are not inclined to view MET problems from the
fiduciary perspective of ERISA.
The states and the DOL should consider regular channels of infor-
mation exchange. When either a state or the DOL receives a complaint
about a MET, there must be a formal system for notifying the other of
that complaint. A decision can then be made as to which system of law
should be pursued in the first instance. If solvency is an immediate
problem, the states should proceed under their laws; if abuses in the
administrative fee structure are uncovered, the matter should be re-
ferred to the DOL.
Even more important is a procedure for exchanging information af-
ter one branch has taken action. This becomes particularly crucial af-
ter a state has identified an unscrupulous MET promoter. The best
way to prevent rollovers of METs is to obtain an injunction on the
federal level. Once such an injunction has been obtained, the informa-
tion would then be sent by the DOL to all state insurance commission-
ers. The information can then be sent to agents in the field in an effort
to choke off the marketing mechanisms of most METs. When a previ-
ously enjoined MET promoter comes to the attention of any state in-
surance official, that official would refer the matter to the DOL for
possible contempt proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Even in a world of perfect cooperation and information, the fact re-
mains that the economic and social reasons behind the MET phenome-
non still exist and probably will continue to impel the appearance of
these entities. With health coverage an accepted part of most employ-
ment contracts, employers will continue to look for the least expensive
provider of such services. Despite the press coverage of MET failures,
255. See ERISA § 506, 29 U.S.C. § 1136 (1976).
256. See March Hearings, supra note 7, at 40.
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many employers will not look beyond the initial cost to examine the
probability that the MET will actually deliver those benefits.
Therefore, the best defense against MET abuse is to increase the risk
of doing business for MET entrepreneurs. It is time for the regulators
to move beyond the jurisdictional issue and begin aggressive enforce-
ment efforts with effective remedies. The cost of health care is an in-
creasingly large factor in the economy, and how the state and federal
governments react to it is of vital concern. What remains perhaps the
most lasting legacy of the MET issue is the fact that it has forced Con-
gress and government on all levels to address fundamental questions of
policy. If, as now seems likely, the MET phenomenon has sparked a
new awareness of the need for effective intergovernmental action in the
health benefit area, perhaps the personal tragedies of MET victims may
one day be considered important sacrifices toward a solution of this
vexing problem of national significance.
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